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Tipping the Scales in Favor of 
Charitable Bequests: A Critique 
 
Elizabeth R. Carter
*
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Public policy favors testamentary bequests to charity.  At least, that 
is the claim of numerous courts and legislative bodies.  The policy 
favoring charitable bequests may tip the scales in deciding the proper 
interpretation of a will, or the merits of an undue influence, or incapacity 
claim.  Paradoxically, courts and legislative bodies rarely discuss the 
source of this public policy.
1
  Nor do they inquire into the policy’s 
wisdom,
2
 though they should. 
In the coming years, we will see a staggering amount of money 
change hands as a result of death—mainly thanks to the Baby Boomers.3  
The Boomers will receive inheritances of about $8.4 trillion from their 
own parents.
4
  In turn, the Boomers are expected to leave $30 trillion to 
their own heirs.
5
  Death, it seems, is now an important part of many 
financial plans.  “Many boomers . . . have been lagging behind in their 
 
* Judge Anthony J. Graphia & Jo Ann Graphia, Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana 
State University. LL.M. in Taxation, University of Alabama School of Law; J.D., Tulane 
University School of Law; B.S., University of Memphis; B.A. University of Memphis. 
The author thanks LSU for its generous research support and, in particular, her research 
assistants: Rebecca Luster, Edward Waters, and Taheera Randolph. The author thanks 
Professor Mark Glover and Professor Randy Trahan for their invaluable advice. The 
author also thanks her parents, Drs. Michael and Sarah Carter for inspiring this article. 
1. See, e.g., In re Stalp, 359 N.Y.S.2d 749, 753 (Surr. Ct. 1974) (“It requires no 
extended discussion of local (New York) law to establish that our public policy favors 
charitable giving.”); see In re Estate of Baum, 211 A.2d 522, n.2 (1965) (“It is difficult to 
conceive of a Commonwealth public policy that is more fundamental or more meaningful 
than its frequently restated policy of encouragement to charities and charitable giving in 
the public interest.”). 
2. See supra note 1. 
3. Baby boomers are “[m]embers of the large generation born from 1946 to 1964 . . 
. .” Baby Boomers: The Gloomiest Generation, PEW RESEARCH, (June 25, 2008), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/06/25/baby-boomers-the-gloomiest-generation/. 
4. See METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF INHERITANCE 
AND WEALTH TRANSFER TO BABY BOOMERS 6 (2010) [hereinafter METLIFE]. 
5. See ACCENTURE, THE “GREATER” WEALTH TRANSFER: CAPITALIZING ON THE 
INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFT IN WEALTH 1 (2012) [hereinafter ACCENTURE]. 
1
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savings, betting on—hoping for—big bequests, especially since many of 
them suffered big losses in 2008.”6  Whether they will actually receive 
those bequests is an entirely different question.  Some experts believe 
that increases in average life expectancy and the associated costs will 
result in many Americans outliving their savings.
7
  But there is another 
less obvious reason why would-be heirs should not count on receiving an 
inheritance from their parents; charities and non-profit organizations.  
Heirs are not the only ones banking on their parents’ deaths. Charities are 
also relying on the Baby Boomer wealth transfer—predicting a “golden 
age of philanthropy.”8  Unlike the typical heir, however, charities are in 
the business of soliciting gratuitous transfers, often quite aggressively. 
The potential for conflict between would-be heirs and charities should be 
obvious, yet little scholarship considers the issue. 
The public policy favoring testamentary bequests to charities is well 
established in the law.  However, that public policy can, and does, 
conflict with other equally well-founded public policies.  When 
confronted with this conflict, courts are often dismissive or even hostile 
towards the parties seeking to challenge a testamentary bequest to a 
charity.  I argue that the policy favoring charitable giving has gone too 
far and has, in some instances, undermined other important public 
policies.  Specifically, courts and legislators have strengthened the 
charitable bequest policy without giving enough consideration to other, 
equally important public policies.  This problem is not new. History 
shows that similar policy conflicts have arisen periodically since late 
antiquity, if not earlier.  The parameters of the problem, however, are 
somewhat new.  The governing law, available technologies, and familial 
relationships have certainly evolved since the time of late antiquity.  This 
article examines how the public policy favoring charitable bequests 
conflicts with various aspects of the equally important public policies of 
testamentary freedom and family protection. 
 
6. Anne Tergesen, Counting on an Inheritance? Count Again., WALL ST. J., June 
11, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303990604577370001234970954.html; 
see also, Steve Rosen, Kids and Money: If You Plan to Leave an Inheritance, Manage 
Expectations, KENTUCKY.COM, Oct. 20, 2013, 
http://www.kentucky.com/2013/10/20/2885759/kids-and-money-if-you-plan-to.html. 
7. Tergesen, supra note 6. 
8. Richard C. Morais, Huge Wave in Charitable Giving Still Coming, FORBES (Oct. 
2, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/02/estate-tax-bill-gates-boston-college-
personal-finance-bc.html; see also Julia Love, These Days, Colleges Urge Young Alumni 
to Give . . . Posthumously, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 20, 2012, at  A20. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/1
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Part II considers the competing public policies of testamentary 
freedom, family protection, and charitable bequests, as well as the 
existing legal doctrines aimed at furthering these policies.  Part III 
examines the social and legal origins of charitable bequests and the 
periodic attempts to balance charitable bequests with other important 
policy considerations.  Part IV examines the role of the non-profit sector 
in America today.  Specifically, Part IV considers the size and scope of 
the nonprofit industry, the legal and economic benefits the nonprofit 
industry enjoys, and the manner in which nonprofits solicit charitable 
bequests.  Part V illustrates how the current law fails to strike the 
appropriate balance between the competing policies, as the current law is 
too favorable to charities and reform is needed.  Part VI concludes. 
 
II.  Competing Public Policies 
 
American law favors charitable giving, testamentary freedom, and 
family protection as matters of public policy.  For thousands of years 
Western society struggled to strike the appropriate balance between these 
competing concerns.  Today, a number of laws and doctrines promote 
and protect these public policy concerns. 
 
A.  Freedom of Testation 
 
In every American jurisdiction, “[t]he first principle in the law of 
wills is freedom of testation.”9  At its core, testamentary freedom means 
that a “testator ‘may dispose of his property as he pleases, and that [he] 
may indulge his prejudice against his relations and in favor of strangers, 
and that, if he does so, it is no objection to his will.’”10  Looking to state 
statutes and centuries of jurisprudence, numerous courts have described 
freedom of testation as a matter of public policy.
11
  A variety of laws and 
 
9. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
489, 491 (1975). 
10. Breeden v. Stone, 992 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. 2000) (citing Lehman v. 
Lindenmeyer, 109 P.956, 959 (1909)). 
11. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. 2009) (“[O]ur 
statutes clearly reveal a public policy in support of testamentary freedom.”); see also 
Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954) (“[W]e submit that 
taken together they reveal a long-accepted pattern of public attitude and public policy in 
this state respecting an almost unrestricted right to dispose of one’s property on death.”); 
Monroe v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302, 316 (1867) (“[I]t is the policy of the law to secure to 
every one the right to dispose of his property in accordance with his individual will[]”). 
3
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doctrines protect this fundamental organizing principal.  For example, in 
order to exercise testamentary rights, the testator must (1) possess 
testamentary capacity at the time he executes the testament, and (2) 
execute the testament in compliance with the form prescribed by law.
12
  
Although the nuances of these requirements vary by state, the object of 
both is to safeguard, among other things, testamentary freedom. 
Three interrelated concepts aimed at ensuring freedom of testation 
are important for our purposes: (1) the doctrine of undue influence; (2) 
the prohibition on a beneficiary of a testament from serving as a witness 
or assisting in the preparation of the testament; and (3) related attorney 
ethics rules.Undue Influence. 
To ensure that the decedent’s testament represents the true 
expression of his will, his testament may be set aside if it was procured 
through fraud, duress, or, most commonly, undue influence.
13
  Although 
the undue influence doctrine and the related evidentiary issues vary from 
state-to-state, the essential thrust of the doctrine is to ensure freedom of 
testation.  Undue influence invalidates a testament executed in proper 
form by a person possessing testamentary capacity because the 
“testator’s free will is destroyed and, as a result, the testator does 
something contrary to his ‘true’ desires.”14 Not all influence is undue.15  
To be “undue” the influence must actually overcome the free agency of 
the testator.
16
  The influence must have “so impaired the volition of the 
donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the 
volition of the donor.”17 In contrast, “legitimate influence” such as 
“[i]nfluence obtained by kindness and affection” is not undue.18  The line 
between acceptable influence and undue influence is frustratingly 
difficult to ascertain in some cases and has been criticized by a number 
of scholars. 
To succeed on an undue influence claim, most jurisdictions require 
the presence of four factors, namely: susceptibility, opportunity, 
disposition, and coveted result.
19
 Susceptibility refers to “a person who is 
susceptible of being unduly influenced by the person charged with 
 
12. See, e.g., Dean v. Jordan, 79 P.2d 331, 335 (Wash. 1938). 
13. See, e.g., THOMAS E. ATKINSON, WILLS at §54-61 ( 2d ed.) . 
14. In re Estate of Rotax, 429 A.2d 1304, 1305 (Vt. 1981) (citation omitted). 
15. See In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000). 
16. See In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P.2d 268, 273-74 (Okla. 1995); EUNICE L. 
ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS at §7:2 ( 2d ed.) [Hereinafter WILL CONTESTS]. 
17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1479 (2013). 
18. See Haneberg, 14 P.3d at 1096. 
19. See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:2. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/1
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exercising undue influence.”20  The testator’s physical and mental 
conditions are relevant in determining his susceptibility to influence.
21
  
Often, this means the testator had some diminished physical or mental 
capacity—yet he was not so diminished as to actually lack testamentary 
capacity.  In practice, the line between undue influence and lack of 
capacity is not always clear.  Facts giving rise to an undue influence 
claim will typically support a lack of capacity argument as well.  As a 
result, both challenges are often brought together.
22
  Opportunity refers 
to “the opportunity of the person charged to exercise such influence on 
the susceptible person to procure the improper favor.”23  Disposition 
means “a disposition on the part of the party charged to influence unduly 
such susceptible person for the purpose of procuring an improper favor 
either for himself or another.”24  Finally, a coveted result is “a result 
caused by, or the effect of, such undue influence.”25  The failure of the 
testator to provide for “the natural objects of the testator’s bounty[]” is 
often evidence of a coveted result.
26
 
In evaluating these factors, courts also consider whether the testator 
and the alleged influencer had a confidential relationship.
27
  The 
existence of a confidential relationship makes a finding of undue 
influence more likely.  Some jurisdictions require a confidential 
relationship as a threshold issue in all undue influence cases.
28
  In the 
jurisdictions that do not explicitly require a confidential relationship as 
threshold issue, findings of undue influence in the absence of a 
confidential relationship are unusual.
29
  Regardless of the specific 
approach taken by any individual jurisdiction, the existence or non-
existence of a confidential relationship is a critical determination in all 
undue influence cases. 
One of the more challenging aspects of undue influence cases is 
deciding which relationships constitute confidential relationships.  
 
20. In re Estate of Christen, 239 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1976) (citation omitted). 
21. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:3. 
22. See Jeffery G. Sherman, Can Religious Influence Ever Be “Undue” Influence?, 
73 BROOK. L. REV. 579, 619-20 (2008). 
23. Christen, 239 N.W.2d at 531 (citation omitted). 
24. Id. (citation omitted). 
25. Id. (citation omitted). 
26. Sherman, supra note 22, at 619. 
27. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:4. 
28. See, e.g., In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000); In re Estate 
of Gersbach, 960 P.2d 811, 814 (N.M. 1998). 
29. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §7:4. 
5
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Generally, a confidential relationship is a “relationship of inequality” 
meaning “a relationship in which the testator reposes an exceptional 
degree of reliance on the integrity and loyalty of another, either because 
of that other person’s knowledge or status or because of the testator’s 
dependence or subservience.”30  Most jurisdictions agree that traditional 
fiduciary relationships—like the attorney-client relationship or the 
relationship between the holder of a power of attorney and the 
grantor
31—may give rise to a relationship of confidence.32  Some 
jurisdictions go so far as to call fiduciary relationships “confidential per 
se.”33  Confidential relationships, however, include more types of 
relationships than legally recognized fiduciary relationships.  Whether a 
relationship constitutes a confidential relationship is a question of fact, 
generally requiring proof that the relationship was either (1) a reliant 
relationship or (2) a dominant-subservient relationship.
34
  A variety of 
relationships may form the basis of confidential relationships if those 
additional facts are present.  Courts have found the following 
relationships, when coupled with evidence of a reliant or dominant-
subservient aspect, to be confidential relationships: “a close confidential 
friendship[,]”35 “a clergyman-parishioner relationship,[]”36 a caregiver 
relationship,
37
 and a banker-customer relationship.
38
 
 
1.  Interested Parties 
 
The second doctrine aimed at ensuring freedom of testation 
prohibits an interested party from serving as a witness to the will or 
assisting in its preparation.
39
  This rule “seeks to insure that testators act 
free of influence from subscribing witnesses.”40  The existence of an 
 
30. Sherman, supra note 22, at 624. 
31. Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006); Blissard v. 
White, 515 So. 2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Miss. 1987). 
32. See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at § 7:4; Sherman, supra note 22, at 624. 
33. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
34. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 624-25. 
35. In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
36. Id. 
37. Bean v. Wilson, 661 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 2008). 
38. Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
39. See, e.g., Triestman v. Kilgore, 838 S.W.2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam) 
(“A competent witness to a will is one who receives no pecuniary benefit under its 
terms.”) (citation omitted). 
40. In re Estate of Tkachuck, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Ct. App. 1977); see also In re 
Estate of Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (“An obvious purpose 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/1
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interested witness or the involvement of an interested person in the 
preparation of a testament typically supports a finding of undue 
influence.
41
  Similarly, the involvement of interested parties tends to 
prove that the will was executed under suspicious circumstances.  The 
scope and effect of the rule varies.  A few states automatically purge any 
bequest to a subscribing witness or notary.
42
  The more common 
approach, in contrast, allows the bequest to stand if there are additional 
disinterested witnesses.
43
  At least two states do not invalidate the 
bequest, but by statute provide that the existence of an interested witness 
creates a presumption of undue influence.
44
  Those states that do prohibit 
bequests to interested witnesses typically seek to strike a balance 
between testamentary freedom and family protection.  To prevent a 
family member from being disinherited simply because he witnessed the 
will, many states will still allow the interested witness to receive an 
intestate or other share of property.
45
  Another issue of some variation is 
the scope of persons subject to the rule.  Some states apply their rule to 
both interested witnesses and the spouses of interested parties by 
invalidating bequests to the spouse of a witness.
46
  In contrast, a number 
of states expressly allow bequests to charities with which a witness is 
associated.
47
  Some states also expressly allow a creditor to serve as a 
witness.
48
 
 
[of this rule], was to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a will to thwart the 
intention of the testatrix.”). 
41. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6112 (West 2013). 
42. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1582 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-1 (West 
2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (West 2013). 
43. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258 
(West 2013);  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2330 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 551:3 (2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1998); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-103 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.07 
(West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-112 (2013). 
44. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6112; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.160 (WEST 2013). 
45. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258 
(West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1582 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. (West 2013); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2330 (2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2 (McKinney 
2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-103 (2013); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 11.12.160 (2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 853.07 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-112 (2013). 
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45a-258 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1582.1 
(2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:3 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-504 (2013); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 41-2-1 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.07 (West 2013). 
47. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258 (West 2013). 
48. See R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §33-6-2 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. §41-2-2 
(West 2013). 
7
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2.  Attorney Ethics Rules 
 
The attorney ethics rules also seek to prevent an attorney from 
negatively affecting a client’s exercise of his testamentary freedom.  
Model Rule 1.8(c) prevents attorneys from preparing wills in which they 
receive large gifts and from soliciting testamentary gifts from clients: 
 
A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a 
client, including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf 
of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person 
related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the 
lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the 
client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons 
include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent 
or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or 
the client maintains a close, familial relationship.
49
 
 
The rule imposes a duty on attorneys, for the benefit of their clients 
and the profession, to refrain from engaging in any conduct that could 
raise an inference of undue influence.
50
  “An attorney must be as careful 
to avoid the appearance of evil as he is to avoid evil itself.”51  To that 
end, paragraph (k) of Rule 1.8 goes further and imputes the conflict to all 
other lawyers in the associated firm.
52
  In interpreting this rule, some 
states have suggested it also applies to serving as a witness to a will.
53
 
Paragraph (f) of Rule 1.8 is similarly aimed at protecting the client 
from undue influence.  Rule 1.8(f) prohibits an attorney from accepting 
payment for his services from someone other than his client unless “(1) 
the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the 
lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-
lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a 
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”54  In the estate-planning 
 
49. MODEL RULES. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983). 
50. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Lanocha, 896 A.2d 996, 
998 (2006); State v. Eisenberg, 138 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Wis. 1965). 
51. State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Wis. 1972). 
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983). 
53. See, e.g., People v. Berge, 620 P.2d 23, 27 (Colo. 1980) (en banc). 
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8.  Rule 1.6 addresses the duty of the 
attorney to maintain the client’s confidentiality.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/1
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context, this rule is intended to prevent undue influence.
55
  When an 
attorney is paid by a client’s testamentary-heir, the court and the public 
might fairly question whether the attorney’s loyalty and independence 
have been affected.
56
 
 
B.  Family Protection 
 
The public policy supporting family protection also permeates the 
law of wills.  This policy imposes a legal and moral duty on family 
members to support one another financially.  Familial support obligations 
have ancient roots and essentially recognize that families form an 
economic unit.
57
  In the law of wills, several doctrines protect immediate 
family members from disinheritance by a testator. 
 
1.  Spousal Share Statutes 
 
Perhaps the most significant family protection mechanism is the 
inability of a testator to fully disinherit his surviving spouse.
58
  With the 
exceptions of most
59
 of the community property jurisdictions (in which 
spousal protection is assured through the community property laws), and 
Georgia,
60
 all states have elective share statutes that prevent the testator 
from fully disinheriting his surviving spouse.
61
  In most jurisdictions 
 
1.6. 
55. See Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890 (N.J. 1981). 
56. Id.; ABA Formal Ethics Op. 02-428 (2002) (Drafting will on recommendation 
of potential beneficiary who also is client). 
57. See Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eved and the Origin of Legal Rights, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 516, 528 (2000-2001); John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1020-28 (2001). 
58. See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My 
Property to Whomever I Choose (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving 
the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 781-82 (2006); Mark Glover, Formal Execution and 
Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 411, 415-17 (2009). 
59. Louisiana, a community property state, also has an elective share statute. See 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2432 (2013). 
60. GA. CODE ANN. §53-4-1 (2013) provides “A testator, by will, may make any 
disposition of property that is not inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the public 
policy of the state and may give all the property to strangers, to the exclusion of the 
testator’s spouse and descendants.” 
61. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 58, at 416-17; Kenneth Rampino, Comment, 
Spousal Disinheritance in Rhode Island: Barrett v. Barrett and the (De)Evolution of the 
Elective Share Law, 12 RODGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 420, 450 (2007). 
9
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“[t]his probate doctrine allows a surviving spouse to take a legislatively 
prescribed portion of the decedent spouse’s estate regardless of the terms 
of the will.”62  Spousal share statutes are based on two theories of 
marriage: the “partnership theory” and the “support theory.”63  “The 
partnership theory of marriage recognizes that both partners have 
contributed to the accumulated estate[]” and should, therefore, share in 
its benefits.
64
  Like community property, the partnership theory of 
marriage recognizes that both spouses work together and should share in 
the “fruits of the marriage.”65  In contrast, “[t]he support theory 
recognizes that during their joint lives, spouses owe each other mutual 
duties of support, and these duties continue in some form after death in 
favor of the survivor, as a claim on the decedent spouse’s estate.”66  If a 
testator fails to provide for his spouse by will, then the support theory 
provides the surviving spouse with a claim against his estate for financial 
support.
67
  The support theory seeks to prevent the surviving spouse 
“from becoming society’s ward by preventing impoverishment of the 
surviving spouse.”68  Approaches, of course, vary by state and may 
reflect one
69
 or both
70
 theories of marriage. 
 
2.  Homestead Statutes 
 
In addition to elective share statutes, a number of jurisdictions have 
homestead statutes or constitutional provisions that protect the economic 
 
62. Glover, supra note 58, at 416. 
63. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hjersted, 135 P.3d 202, 207 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
64. In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999); accord In re 
Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001). 
65. In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d at 642. 
66. Id; accord In re Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W.2d 335, 342-43 (S.D. 2013). 
67. In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 993 P.2d at 642. 
68. Williams v. Williams, 517 S.E.2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1999) (citation omitted); 
accord Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1167 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (“states 
responded by passing elective share statutes to protect widows from being disinherited 
and left with no reasonable means of financial support.”) (citation omitted); In re Estate 
of Merkel, 618 P.2d 872, 876 (Mont. 1980) (“The primary purpose of the elective share 
statutes is to insure that the surviving spouse’s needs are met, and that the spouse is not 
left penniless.”) (citation omitted). 
69. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W.2d 335, 342-43 (S.D. 2013) 
(holding that South Dakota statute is intended to satisfy spousal support duty);.In re 
Estate of Bilse, 746 A.2d 1090, 1092 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that the New Jersey 
statute is need based). 
70. See, e.g., In re Estate of Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001) (“Two 
rationales underlie our elective share system: support and contribution.”). 
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interest of the surviving spouse and/or the children of the decedent.  
Broadly, there are two types of homestead statutes: family home statutes 
and fixed sum statutes.  Family home statutes protect the interest of a 
surviving spouse and children in the family home. 
 
As a matter of public policy, the purpose of [these 
statutes] is to promote the stability and welfare of the 
state by securing to the householder a home, so that the 
homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the 
reach of financial misfortune and the demands of 
creditors . . . .
71
 
 
The family home statutes, therefore, recognize the significant 
emotional and economic interests a decedent’s spouse and children have 
in the family home.
72
  A number of the family home-type homestead 
statutes allow the surviving spouse and/or minor children to remain in 
the family home even if the testator leaves the home to some other 
person.
73
 The property rights conferred by this right, and their duration, 
vary by state.
74
  Homestead statutes further protect the surviving spouse 
and children by exempting the family home from seizure and sale by 
creditors.
75
 
The fixed sum-type homestead statutes, in contrast, give the 
surviving spouse and dependent children a claim to a fixed sum of 
money from the decedent’s estate rather than rights to real estate.76  The 
sum of money is ordinarily fixed by statute and is quite modest.
77
  The 
policy considerations behind the fixed sum statutes are similar to the 
family home statutes.
78
  To that end, the sum of money that the surviving 
spouse and children receive under the applicable homestead statute is 
 
71. Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1988). 
72. In re Estate of Bonde, 694 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
73. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-402 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
30-16-02 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 58 § 311 (West 2013); TEX. ESTATES CODE § 
102.005 (West 2013); see also Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. 1997). 
74. See supra note 73. 
75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-402(c) (West 2013); Pub. Health Trust of 
Dade Cnty., 531 So. 2d at 946, 947; Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1001-02. 
76. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-412 (2013). 
77. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2402 
(2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-402 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-412; MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 474.290 (West 2013). 
78. See Carter v. Coxwell, 479 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Ala. 1985). 
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usually exempt from the claims of the decedent’s creditors.79 
 
3.  Family Allowance Statutes 
 
Family allowance statutes offer the testator’s surviving spouse and 
minor children some additional protections.  These statutes generally 
give the surviving spouse and minor children the right to receive a time-
limited allowance for their support during the administration of the 
testator’s estate.80  “[T]he family allowance [is] a statutory creation 
designed to provide sustenance for the family during the settlement of 
the estate . . . .”81  Most family allowance statutes limit the time period of 
the support to one year.
82
  Unlike other family protection mechanisms, 
family allowances typically fall within the discretion of the courts.
83
  In 
determining whether a spouse or child is entitled to an allowance, courts 
consider a variety of factors to determine need including age, health, 
previous standard of living, value of the estate, and the value of other 
resources available to the claimant.
84
  If a court does decide to award a 
family allowance, the payment is typically made in priority to other 
debts.
85
 
 
4.  Undue Influence as Family Protection 
 
Courts sometimes use the doctrine of undue influence to invalidate 
testaments that fail to provide for the testator’s immediate family.  Thus, 
undue influence operates to ensure freedom of testation and, in some 
instances, family protection.  Professor Melanie Leslie examined a 
number of undue influence cases and observed: 
 
79. See supra note 73. 
80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2404 (2013); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540 
(West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2403 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
474.260 (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-414 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, 
§ 2-404 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-404 (West 2013). 
81. In re Estate of Seymour, 671 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Parson v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
82. See supra note 77. 
83. See supra note 77; see also In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 978 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); In re Estate of Butler, 607 P.2d 956, 959 (Ariz. 1980). 
84. In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d at 978; MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.260 (West 
2013). 
85. See Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687. 
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Although the opinions studied habitually recited that a 
court’s sole purpose is to effectuate the testator’s true 
intentions, a closer inspection reveals that a significant 
number of courts employed a governing rule less 
concerned with divining testamentary intent than with 
determining whether the reason behind the disposition 
was justifiable in the court’s view.  Courts were much 
more likely to honor testamentary intent when the will 
provided for family members as opposed to non-
relatives.
86
 
 
Several aspects of the undue influence doctrine facilitate courts in 
protecting the testator’s family.  If a court invalidates a testament on 
undue influence grounds, then the decedent’s property will generally 
pass under the laws of intestacy—which will benefit his surviving spouse 
and immediate relatives.
87
  Two important aspects of the undue influence 
doctrine are easily seen as family protection mechanisms: the 
confidential relationship requirement and the coveted result/unnatural 
bequest requirement. 
The existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and 
the influencer is a threshold issue in most undue influence cases.
88
  
Family members benefit from this requirement because courts are 
hesitant to find family members in a confidential relationship with each 
other—thus, it is less likely for a testament to be invalidated due to the 
influence of a close relative.  Courts struggle to fit family relationships 
into the confidential relationship framework—particularly spousal 
relationships and parent-child relationships.  In practice, “[c]ourts are 
reluctant to find a confidential relationship among spouses and blood 
relatives.”89  “[The] failure to find a confidential relationship in the 
context of the family is not because family relationships lack the 
characteristics of dependence and reliance—indeed it is these very 
characteristics that are the hallmark of the family relationship.”90  The 
 
86. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 30 ARIZ. L. REV, 235, 
243-44 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
87. See Ray Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 611 
(1997). 
88. See infra Part II.A.1. 
89. See Madoff, supra note 87 at 602. 
90. See id. at 603. 
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analysis is often complicated when children or spouses stand in positions 
that courts often view as confidential relationships—in particular, 
caregivers and power of attorney holders.
91
  In the spousal context, courts 
take a variety of approaches. At least one court explicitly held that the 
“relationship between a husband and wife is a confidential relationship . . 
. .”92  Other courts recognize that result is harsh in light of the evidentiary 
function of the existence of a confidential relationship.  Some courts 
specifically hold that the spousal relationship, although confidential in 
nature, does not necessarily carry the same evidentiary presumptions as 
other confidential relationships.
93
  As one court explained: 
 
Although it has been said that a proper relationship 
between a husband and wife is often a ‘fiduciary’ or 
‘confidential’ relationship, something beyond this 
normal spousal relationship must exist before a 
‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’ relationship can be found for 
the purposes of a claim of undue influence.
94
 
 
Courts are reluctant to find a confidential relationship even where 
one spouse is acting as the caregiver for the other spouse, managing his 
financial affairs, or involved in the preparation of his testament—all facts 
which would ordinarily support a finding of undue influence.
95
  Parent-
child relationships are equally challenging.  Courts are reluctant to find 
 
91. See infra Part V.B.1. 
92. Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). 
93. See In re Estate of Langston v. Williams, 57 So. 3d 618, 622 (Miss. 2011); 
accord Jacobs v. Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The 
confidential relationship which exists between a husband and wife is not one which may 
be considered in the law governing will contests.”); see also Keasler v. Estate of Keasler, 
973 S.W.2d 213, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that one spouse exercises 
great influence over the affairs of life as well as home and domestic concerns is 
insufficient to raise a presumption of invalidity of the will.”). 
94. Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); accord, In 
re Estate of Baumgarten, 975 N.E.2d 651, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he law does not 
and should not presume . . . undue influence . . . because the spouse has been able 
throughout the marriage to have considerable influence on her spouse.”) (quoting another 
source). 
95. See, e.g., Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d at 479 (finding no evidence of a confidential 
relationship between decedent and his wife despite wife serving as decedent’s primary 
caretaker); In re Estate of Mowdy, 973 P.2d 345, 349 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998) (finding no 
undue influence on part of wife who was previously decedent’s legal secretary where 
white personally typed decedent’s will). 
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that these relationships are confidential relationships,
96
 even where a 
child is serving in a relationship that is ordinarily classified as a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship.
97
 
The coveted result/unnatural bequest aspect of the undue influence 
analysis also tends to serve a family protection function because it often 
makes it easier for family members to prove a case of undue influence 
perpetrated by a non-relative.  Courts presume that testators will 
normally leave their property to their spouse and close blood relatives.
98
  
This viewpoint makes it easier for a testator’s family to establish an 
undue influence case whenever a testator omits family in favor of a third 
party.  Some courts essentially require a finding of some “unnatural” 
disposition in order to establish an undue influence claim.
99
  “[T]he 
establishment of the fact that the testament executed would not have 
been executed but for such influence is generally predicated upon a 
consideration of whether the testament executed is unnatural in its terms 
of disposition of property.”100  In jurisdictions where a finding of 
 
96. See, e.g., Pyle v. Sayers, 34 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (“The 
influence of children over parents is legitimate so long as they do not extend a positive 
dictation and control over the mind of the testator.”); Bills v. Lindsay, 909 S.W.2d 434, 
440 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“A normal relationship between a mentally competent parent 
and an adult child is not per se a confidential relationship and it raises no presumption of 
invalidity of the transaction.”). 
97. See, e.g., Eddleman v. Estate of Farmer, 740 S.W.2d 141, 142-43 (Ark. 1987) 
(finding no undue influence on part of daughter/caretaker of decedent who left his estate 
to her and no property to his other daughter); Jacobs v. Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no undue influence on son-in-law who prepared will 
for testator which substantially benefitted testator’s daughter and son-in-law’s wife); 
Carter v. Carter, 526 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (describing sons’ role in 
helping mother execute a will as “the acts of dutiful sons who helped their mother draw 
up her will and execute it” rather than “active procurement”); Estate of McCorkle v. 
Beason, 27 So. 3d 1180, 1186 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding no undue influence or 
confidential relationship between daughter and testator even though daughter held power 
of attorney for father, shared a bank account and safe deposit box with father, discussed 
will with father and then typed it for him);  In re Estate of Angle, 777 A.2d 114, 123 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2001) (“A parent-child relationship does not establish the existence of a 
confidential relationship nor does the fact that the proponent has a power of attorney 
where the decedent wanted the proponent to act as attorney-in-fact.”); In re Estate of 
Jakiella, 510 A2d 815, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that neither parent-child 
relationship nor child’s appointment of attorney-in-fact for mother required a finding of a 
confidential relationship). 
98. See Leslie, supra note 86, at 245-46. 
99. See, e.g., Baxter v. Grasso, 740 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (“It is 
settled law that to constitute undue influence, four factors must be satisfied: (1) [an] 
unnatural disposition has been made . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
100. In re Estate of Johnson, 340 S.W.3d 769, 783 (Tex. App. 2011) (quoting 
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suspicious circumstances is required to support a claim of undue 
influence, courts typically consider unnatural dispositions as evidence of 
suspicious circumstances.
101
  Still, other courts consider an unnatural 
disposition as one of several factors that can support an undue influence 
claim.
102
  The naturalness of a disposition is typically established if the 
testator, for no apparent reason, left his property to someone other than 
the natural objects of his bounty.
103
  The testator’s spouse and intestate 
heirs are, generally, the persons deemed to be the natural objects of his 
bounty.
104
  Regardless of the stated evidentiary significance in a 
particular jurisdiction, unnatural dispositions are often dispositive in 
undue influence cases.  In the course of her study, Professor Leslie 
observed that “many of the opinions dealing with contested gifts to non-
relatives concentrated . . . on whether, in the court’s opinion the gift to a 
non-relative was justifiable.”105  She further observed that: 
 
a significant number of courts confronted with wills that 
disinherited family members in favor of non-family 
members upheld or imposed findings of undue influence 
based on minimal evidence, or evidence that would be 
insufficient to meet the contestant’s burden of proof in a 
case where the will’s primary beneficiaries were non-
relatives[.]
106
 
 
C.  Charitable Giving 
 
The law of wills also furthers the more general public policy 
favoring charitable giving. 
 
 
another source); accord Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 900 N.E.2d 101, 114 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2009) (noting that one of the facts supporting an undue influence claim is an unnatural 
disposition); Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“An 
important consideration in determining whether undue influence has occurred is whether 
the disposition of the property was ‘unnatural’.”). 
101. See, e.g., Slusarenko v. Slusarenko, 147 P.3d 920, 930 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“The following factors may constitute suspicious circumstances . . . (6) an unnatural or 
unfair disposition of property.”). 
102. See In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598, 610 (Tex. App. 2001). 
103. See Ruestman, 111 S.W.3d at 481. 
104. See id. 
105. Leslie, supra note 86, at 246. 
106. Id. at 245. 
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1.  Identification of Beneficiaries 
 
Generally, a testament must identify the testator’s beneficiaries with 
reasonable certainty.
107
  The testator does not have to use any particular 
language, however, the “beneficiary must be capable of identification . . . 
.”108  “If the writing is so uncertain or confused or ambiguous that the 
testator’s intentions cannot be reasonably ascertained, it is void as a 
testamentary instrument.”109  This rule is often relaxed in the case of 
charitable bequests.  Because gifts to charity are favored, “a charitable 
disposition in a will must be liberally construed to uphold its validity.”110  
Both statutes
111
 and jurisprudence recognize “the validity of charitable 
bequests that do not specify the charity, or even the general charitable 
purpose.”112  If the testator sufficiently expresses his desire that his 
property be used for charitable purposes, then the bequest will stand and 
the executor or trustee may select the particular charities that will receive 
property.
113
 
 
2.  Capacity to Inherit; Lapse 
 
Courts often refuse to apply the doctrine of lapse to charitable 
bequests, which further advances the public policy favoring these 
bequests. A bequest to a person that dies or ceases to exist prior to the 
date of the decedent’s death will lapse.114  When a legacy lapses, it may 
pass to another legatee under the express terms of the will, to another 
person under an anti-lapse statute, or pass to the decedent’s heirs in 
 
107. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 229 S.W.2d 743, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (“The 
law permits one to dispose of his property by will, but the intention of the testator must 
be expressed with sufficient clarity to enable a court to enforce its provisions.”). 
108. Smoot v. McCandless, 461 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Mo. 1970). 
109. Johnson, 229 S.W.2d at 775; accord Holcomb v. Newton, 226 S.W.2d 670 
(Tex. App. 1950); Uloth v. Little, 73 N.E.2d 459 (Mass. 1947). 
110. In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr.3d 685, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
111. See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-515 (West 2013); Ga. CODE ANN. § 53-
4-62 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1572 (2013). 
112. In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 692; accord Marshal v. Trust Co. of 
Ga., 202 S.E.2d 94, 97 (Ga. 1973); In re Estate of Staab, 173 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa 
1970) (“Courts generally subscribe to the view that charitable bequests shall not be 
permitted to fail or lapse for lack of definiteness as to the purpose of the bequest.”). 
113. In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 692. 
114. See, e.g., In re Estate of Micheel, 577 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Iowa 1998); Niemann 
v. Zacharias, 176 N.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Neb. 1970); In re Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W.2d 
448, 450-51 (N.D. 2011). 
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intestacy.
115
  Charitable organizations do not “die” per se, but they do 
sometimes cease to exist.  An existing organization may merge with 
another organization, may cease operations, or may fully dissolve prior 
to the death of the testator.
116
 
When a charitable organization named in a will no longer exists on 
the date of a decedent’s death, the doctrine of lapse should apply.117  In 
practice, however, courts feel “obliged to ensure that the testator’s 
charitable intent is enforced” notwithstanding the non-existence of the 
charitable beneficiary.
118
  If the charitable organization no longer exists 
and has no successor organization, courts may invoke the doctrine of cy 
près and distribute the legacy to other charitable organizations with 
similar purposes.
119
 
 
3.  Conditions 
 
Courts sometimes relieve charitable bequests from the rules 
governing failure of a condition.  When a testator makes a bequest 
subject to a condition, the courts will generally enforce the condition as 
written.  If the condition fails, is not satisfied, or is impossible, the 
bequest should lapse.
120
  In the charitable context, however, courts are 
more lenient.  When a testator gives property to a charity and directs its 
use for a particular purpose, courts will often ignore the condition or 
construe the condition to be merely precatory in nature.
121
  In In re 
Fairchild, for example, the testator made the following bequest: 
 
 
115. See, e.g., In re Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W.2d at 451; see also In re Estate of 
Hanna, 919 So. 2d 104, 106 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); In re Estate of Harper, 975 A.2d 
1155, 1159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). 
116. See Crisp Area YMCA v. Nationsbank, N.A., 526 S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. 2000) 
(charitable organization that was inactive on the date of decedent’s death allowed to 
inherit); Gustafson v. Wesley Found., 469 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1996) (charitable 
organization transferred all of its assets to another organization). 
117. E.g., In re Estate of Brunzel, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 484 (Surr. Ct. 1944); In re 
Estate of Flathers, 288 P. 231, 232 (Wash. 1930). 
118. Gustafson, 469 S.E.2d at 162. 
119. See In re Estate of Leventhal, 212 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Surr. Ct. 1961); R.I. 
Assoc. for Blind v. Nugent, 206 A.2d 527, 530-31 (R.I. 1965). 
120. See In re Estate of Hirschberg, 112 N.Y.S.2d 919, 920-21 (Surr. Ct. 1952); 
Bank One Trust Co. v. Resident Home Ass’n for Mentally Retarded, No. 19660, 2003 
WL 21674987 (Ohio Ct. App. July 18, 2003). 
121. See In re Will of Fairchild, 178 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888-89 (Surr. Ct. 1958); U.S. 
Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Rhilander, 677 P.2d 745, 745 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
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I give a one-fiftieth part to each of the seven following 
named persons and corporations, absolutely, provided, in 
each case, that she or it survive me: . . .  (2) Hopewell 
Society, having its place of business at Number 218 
Gates Avenue, Brooklyn, New York (the said fund to be 
used for the benefit of the Gould Guest House now 
situated at Number 27 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New 
York).
122
 
 
Several legatees argued that the legacy lapsed because the Gould 
Guest House no longer existed and, therefore, the condition could not be 
fulfilled.
123
  The court, however, reasoned that “[t]he parenthetical words 
following the absolute legacy are apparently indicative of the testator’s 
desire that so long as the Society conducted Gould Guest House the fund 
was to be used for that purpose.
124
  Because the Gould Guest House no 
longer existed, the legatee was “free to use the fund in any manner within 
its general charitable functions.”125  Similarly, in Rubel v. Friend, the 
testator made a charitable bequest in trust and directed that the trustees 
use his residuary estate to establish and maintain a convalescent home 
within ten years of his death.
126
  The trustees failed to comply with the 
terms of the testament within the ten-year time frame.
127
  The court 
determined that the failure of the trustees to meet the condition did not 
cause the bequest to lapse because “[e]quity considers the general 
charitable purpose of the testator or donor as the substance of the devise 
or gift . . . .”128  A charitable bequest, in the view of the court, “will not 
be permitted to lapse or be defeated by the mere expiration of time or 
because there cannot be a literal compliance with its provision.”129  
Statutes in a number of jurisdictions now expressly give courts the 
authority to distribute property in accordance with the testator’s general 
charitable intent while striking problematic conditions.
130
 
 
 
122. Fairchild, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 888. 
123. Id. at 889. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 888. 
126. Rubel v. Friend, 101 N.E.2d 445, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 448. 
129. Id. at 449. 
130. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3541 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-22a01 
(2013); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7740.3 (2013). 
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III. Evolution of Charitable Bequests and Competing Public Policies 
 
Throughout history, the law of wills has attempted to strike the 
appropriate balance between testamentary freedom and family 
protection; as soon as the law allowed charitable bequests, that balance 
was affected.  The church—at one time the only sizeable charitable 
organization—repeatedly inserted itself in the dying process and the 
process of preparing and administering wills.  Each time this occurred, 
the church benefitted financially at the expense of testamentary freedom, 
family protection, and the public image of the church.  For centuries, 
societies have struggled to find the appropriate balance and have 
periodically checked the power of the church in the dying and will-
making process.  Today, however, the problem is not limited to religious 
organizations.  Both religious and secular charities are aggressively 
seeking involvement in the testamentary process in hopes of financial 
benefit.  History shows the need for legislative and judicial response. 
 
A. Evolution of the Competing Policies from Late Antiquity through the 
Middle Ages 
 
The challenging public policy questions raised by encouraging 
testamentary bequests to charity can be traced back to late antiquity.  As 
the U.S. Supreme Court succinctly explained: 
 
Charities had their origin in the great command, to love 
thy neighbor as thyself. But when the Emperor 
Constantine permitted his subjects to bequeath their 
property to the church, it was soon abused; so much so, 
that afterwards, when it became too common to give 
land to religious uses, consistently with the free 
circulation of property, the supreme authority of every 
nation in Europe, where Christianity prevailed, found it 
necessary to limit such devises by statutes of 
mortmain.
131
 
 
The Court’s summation oversimplifies matters.  Inheritance laws 
are an ancient concept.  Default schemes of intestacy are found in, 
 
131. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 498 (1860). 
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among other sources, the Code of Hammurabi,
132
 biblical texts,
133
 and the 
Aztec society.
134
  However, the testament as we think of it today—an 
instrument allowing a person to direct the distribution of his property as 
he sees fit—appears to be a creation of Roman law.135  Under the law of 
the Twelve Tables, Roman citizens enjoyed full testamentary freedom in 
the sense that they could dispose of the entirety of their estates at 
death.
136
  Prior to the Twelve Tables, property passed from one male to 
the “next of kin in the male line.”137 The law set forth in the Twelve 
Tables allowed greater freedom, but it still attempted to strike a balance 
between freedom of testation and rules of public order: 
 
The absolute power of bequest, conferred on every 
citizen by the Twelve Tables, was a concession to the 
people. The transfer of property by will at this time 
being an event which, in a small state, might materially 
affect the well being of the community, was an act of 
legislation to which publicity was requisite.
138
 
 
Roman law was highly formalistic.  “The Roman law sought to 
ascertain, fix and determine the true declaration of the last will of a 
testator, by surrounding that declaration by such safeguards as to forbid 
the possibility of fraud or the perversion of the testator’s intention in the 
solemn act of testamentation.”139  To that end, Roman testaments 
required a certain number of competent witnesses—none of whom could 
be named as an heir or related to an heir named in the testament.
140
  In 
addition to requiring publicity and other form requirements, the law 
restricted the persons a testator could name as an heir or legatee.  
 
132. See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, Ancient Land Law: 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 366-67 (1995). 
133. See generally Calum Carmichael, Inheritance in Biblical Sources, 20 L. & 
LITERATURE 229 (2008). 
134. See Francisco Avalos, An Overview of the Legal System of the Aztec Empire, 
86 L. LIBR. J. 259 (1994). 
135. See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §2:1. 
136. See JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS FROM THE 
PANDECTS 352 (1863) [hereinafter PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS]. 
137. JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND HISTORY OF THE 
ROMAN LAW 121 (1848). 
138. Id. 
139. MOSES A. DROPSIE, ROMAN LAW OF TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND GIFTS IN THE 
EVENT OF DEATH, 2 (1892). 
140. See  id. at 80-81. 
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Importantly, for our purposes, Roman law required that the testator name 
a definite and identifiable heir who was a natural person.
141
  
Corporations, societies and other juridical persons could not be named as 
heirs or legatees.
142
  Nor could the testator leave his property to “the 
poor” or for other general pious or charitable causes.143  Policy concerns 
eventually resulted in additional restrictions on testamentary freedom 
that served family protection functions.  For example, testators could 
only disinherit certain heirs—”necessarius haeres”—if there was a valid 
legal cause for disinherison.
144
 
The spread of Christianity forever changed the law.  In 313 A.D., 
Constantine’s Edict of Milan specifically recognized the right of the 
church to own property as a corporation.
145
  A few years later, 
Constantine gave Roman citizens the right to leave their estates to “‘any 
of the most sacred and venerable Catholic churches’”146 rather than to 
their own families.  Very few other juridical persons or indefinite heirs 
could receive testamentary bequests of property.  This practice was soon 
abused and corrupted.
147
 Romans would leave all of their property to the 
church, to the detriment of their children, other relatives, and creditors.
148
  
The church became an incredibly powerful influence in the dying 
process.
149
  This is not particularly surprising.  Fear of death and the 
desire for immortality are universal human characteristics
150
 and the 
church offered the promise of immortality for believers.
151
 
 
141. See  id. at 49. 
142. See id.; PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, supra note 136, at 343-44. 
143. See DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 126; PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, 
supra note 136, at 343-44. 
144. PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, supra note 136, at 354. 
145. See EDICT OF MILAN, in Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum, ch. 48, 
translated in 4 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCES OF EUROPEAN 
HISTORY 28-30 (1897-1907), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/edict-
milan.html. 
146. WILLIAM K. BOYD, THE ECCLESIASTICAL EDICTS OF THE THEODOSIAN CODE 82 
(1905), available at 
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL6965693M/The_ecclesiastical_edicts_of_the_Theodosian
_code. 
147. Id. at 83. 
148. Id. at 84. 
149. See id. 
150. See, e.g., SHELDON SOLOMON, JEFF GREENBERG & TOM PYSZCZYNSKI, PRIDE 
AND PREJUDICE: FEAR OF DEATH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE NO. 6, 201 (2000). 
151. See e.g. Nancy Murphy, Immortality Versus Resurrection in the Christian 
Tradition, 1234 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 76, 77 (2011) 
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Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the resulting 
political power vacuum, the church assumed an even greater role in the 
testamentary process.
152
  Testamentary bequests to the church became 
compulsory rather than simply permitted. The church combined the final 
confession with the act of directing the distribution of property at 
death.
153
  In the West, the church established its own form for executing 
a testament in accordance with Canon law.
154
  These testaments had to be 
executed in the presence of a priest or other religious official—but were 
otherwise lacking many of the formalities required by Roman law.
155
  
The church worked to abolish many aspects of the Roman law aimed at 
protecting the freedom of the testator—such as the requirement of 
disinterested witnesses—in order to enhance the likelihood that the 
church would benefit from a will.
156
  “[M]any councils in France, 
England, and Spain made it a law for the laity, that they should not 
testamentate otherwise than in the presence of their priests.”157  The last 
testament and the last confession were both part of the same act and that 
act required the presence of a priest.
158
  Thus, the members of the clergy 
were the only people capable of receiving testaments in the first place.
159
  
Naturally, these testaments, often delivered orally, contained significant 
bequests to the church.  The church offered salvation and immortality, 
but at a literal monetary price.
160
  “One needs to go but little way into the 
documentary history of the period from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries 
of our era, to find abundant examples of the way in which men bought 
their peace with Heaven . . . .”161 
In 597, Pope Gregory I sent Augustus to England to help spread 
 
152. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at §2.1. 
153. FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, Book II, 318-19 (2d ed. 1898). 
154. See DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 126. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. Id. 
158. C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative 
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and 
the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 188 (1991); James Findley, 
Note, The Debate Over Nonlawyer Probate Judges: A Historical Perspective, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 1143, 1150 (2010). 
159. Barbara R. Hauser, The Tale of the Testament, 12 PROB. & PROP. 58, 62 
(1998). 
160. Joseph Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Près, 8 HARV. L. REV. 69, 79 
(1894). 
161. Id. at 73.. 
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Christianity.
162
  Soon, “the clergy had obtained enormous power, and in a 
great measure controlled the government, which, from their education 
and knowledge, they were peculiarly qualified to administer.”163  The 
Roman clergy were often the only men qualified to act as lawyers “and 
they exercised the profession of religion and law for centuries before 
these vocations were severed and performed by different classes of 
persons.”164  The church took control of the probate system as well as the 
execution of testaments.
165
  Testators needed the help of a priest to 
execute testaments.  The church, in turn, was responsible for interpreting 
and enforcing the terms of those testaments.
166
 
Feudalism and primogeniture resulted in a division of inheritance 
systems in England. Land transferred to the oldest son by operation of 
law and the church had only a limited ability to obtain land by 
testamentary bequest.
167
  The church, however, controlled the system 
governing the transfer of chattels at death. Initially, the church asserted 
jurisdiction over wills that left chattels for religious or pious uses.
168
  
Because testators customarily left a third of their chattels to the church, 
the church essentially asserted jurisdiction over all testate estates.
169
  The 
church eventually “asserted a right to oversee the goods of men who died 
without wills” as well.170  If a man died intestate, then, in the view of the 
church he also died without his last confession.
171
  When this occurred, it 
fell to the church to use the chattels of the deceased to do what it could to 
help his soul.
172
  By the thirteenth century, ecclesiastical courts held 
exclusive jurisdiction over probate and similar matters.
173
 
Testaments proved to be a lucrative business for the clergy from the 
fall of the Western Roman Empire through at least the sixteenth 
century.
174
  The clergy “introduced the mode of disposing estates after 
death by testament, and as they were the only persons capable of drafting 
 
162. See DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 2-3. 
163. See id. at 3. 
164. See id. at 5. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. at 2-5. 
168. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 158, at 1150. 
169. See, e.g., id. 
170. Id. at 1150. 
171. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 153, at 357. 
172. Id. 
173. See, e.g., Findley, supra note 158, at 1150. 
174. DROPSIE, supra note 139, at 5. 
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such instruments, and as they had the care of the souls of the testators . . . 
generous provisions were made for the church, which became greatly 
enriched.”175  Conflict was inevitable. 
 
B.  Competing Policies in England 
 
The church acquired massive land holdings in England.
176
  Although 
primogeniture made it difficult for the church to receive land in a 
testamentary bequest, feudalism actually provided the church with an 
even better opportunity to add to its real estate holdings.  “It seems that 
whenever possible poor freemen preferred to grant their land to the 
monasteries for protection rather than to the rich landowners.”177  The 
church offered more agreeable terms then other feudal lords.
178
  “[T]he 
terms of service exacted of a vassal by the Church were less burdensome 
and . . . the monks not only promised him protection but also assured him 
that they would intercede for his happiness after death.”179  The other 
feudal lords were unhappy with this arrangement.  In their view, 
excessive property ownership by corporations (and churches in 
particular) was inherently problematic because it removed property from 
the stream of commerce.
180
  The feudal aristocracy worried that inter 
vivos donations of property to juridical persons allowed people to avoid 
their feudal services to the detriment of the feudal lords and the nation as 
a whole.
181
  In response, England enacted a series of “mortmain” 
(literally “dead hand”) statutes beginning with the Magna Charta in 1215 
in an effort to recalibrate the competing policy concerns.
182
  The Magna 
Charta provided that “no land would thereafter be alienated except so as 
to retain the services due to the lord of the fees.”183  Those restrictions 
 
175. Id. 
176. HENRY P. TRAWICK, JR., TRAWICK’S REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
FLORIDA, app. A § 1:2 (2012-13 ed.). 
177. Id. 
178. See A. H. Oosterhoff, The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative 
Review, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 257, 266-69 (1977). 
179. TRAWICK, supra note 176, at app. A § 1:3. 
180. See, e.g., Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United 
States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407, 407-09 (1992); Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 265-69. 
181. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 583-88; Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 
265-69; L.S. Bristowe, The Legal Restrictions on Gifts to Charity, 7 L. Q. REV. 262, 266-
67 (1891). 
182. See, e.g., John R. Cunningham, Mortmain Statutes: The Dead Hand Still 
Survives, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 49, 49-50 (1990); Bristowe, supra note 181, at 266-67 (1891). 
183. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 267. 
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soon proved insufficient and a new statute—the Great Charter of 1217—
was enacted.
184
  That act was broader in scope than the Magna Charta 
and provided a procedural mechanism for enforcement.
185
  The 1217 act 
also proved somewhat ineffective and was followed by the 1279 Statute 
of Mortmain, which attempted to expand the scope of the prohibition.
186
 
Family protection was not a major concern initially because existing 
laws and customs protected the family.
187
  A man’s land devolved to the 
eldest son by operation of law under primogeniture, with a life interest, 
or dower, over a portion of those lands going to his widow.
188
  Wills 
dealt with a testator’s chattels, but often just confirmed the default 
tripartite rule of chattel division.
189
  If a man had both children and a wife 
then he could only dispose of one-third of his chattels by testament.
190
  
The remaining two-thirds formed the “reserve” or “legitime” belonging 
to the widow and children.  The surviving widow received one-third, and 
the remaining one-third was divided between the testator’s children.191  
These rules varied somewhat by region and over time—but their general 
thrust remained the same.
192
  The testator’s wife and children were 
entitled to a reserve or legitime that was some fraction of the testator’s 
estate.
193
  The testator could direct the remaining disposable portion of 
his estate to someone other than his wife and children.
194
  In practice, 
however, that disposable portion went to the church either by custom or 
ecclesiastical law.
195
  Testamentary freedom became virtually extinct.
196
 
The early mortmain statutes were simply not aimed at protecting the 
 
184. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 587. 
185. See Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 267. 
186. Id. 
187. See ATKINSON, supra note 13, at 14-15; Orrin K. McMurray, Liberty of 
Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L. REV.  96, 110 (1919). 
188. See George L. Haskins, The Development of the Common Law Dower, 62 
HARV. L. REV. 42, 53 (1948). 
189. See Joseph Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England, 25 
CORNELL L. REV. 337, 342 (1940). 
190. Id. at 341. 
191. Id. 
192. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 153, at 348-50; Thomas E. Atkinson, 
Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 MO. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (1943) 
[hereinafter Atkinson, Brief History]. 
193. See Dainow, supra note 189, at 341-44. 
194. See id. at 341-44. 
195. See id. at 341. 
196. Id. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/1
CARTER - FINAL  
2014] TIPPING THE SCALES 1009 
testator’s family.197  Rather, the early mortmain statutes sought to strike 
the proper balance between the power of the church and the interest of 
society as a whole.
198
  The power struggle between the church and the 
aristocracy continued over the years.
199
  In response to the 1279 Statute 
of Mortmain, the ecclesiastical courts adopted the civil law concept of 
“uses” which essentially allowed the church to obtain the enjoyment of 
even more land and to circumvent the mortmain statutes.
200
  In the 1500s, 
King Henry VIII actively used the powers granted to him under the 
various mortmain statutes to usurp the power of the Catholic Church and 
its landholdings in England.
201
  Parliament enacted the Statute of Uses, 
which invalidated the concept of uses that the church had used to its 
advantage in earlier years.
202
  Yet, the reign of King Henry VIII and the 
Reformation actually coincided with a change in public attitude 
regarding charitable giving—particularly secular giving.203  “[S]everal 
legislative enactments during this time encouraged private philanthropy, 
especially in the areas of education and the relief of the poor, sick, and 
aged.”204  These two developments were not necessarily inconsistent.  
The religious houses had, to some extent, served the poor and needy 
prior to the Reformation.
205
  By encouraging private—but not necessarily 
religious—philanthropy, the state sought “to prevent the poor, the aged, 
and others from becoming a burden on the state . . . .”206  Queen 
Elizabeth I continued this trend during her reign.
207
  The English legal 
system showed an increasingly favorable attitude towards charitable 
secular giving in the following years and the early mortmain statutes 
were eventually weakened and repealed.
208
  Legislation enacted in 1703 
essentially repealed any remaining mortmain statutes and created a new 
 
197. See, e.g., Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268. 
198. Id. 
199. See Atkinson, Brief History, supra note 192, at 112-14. 
200. TRAWICK, supra note 176, at app. A § 1:3 (“Under this system, the owner 
simply conveyed the legal title to his land to some person or corporation for the benefit of 
some named usee; the usee could be such owner himself. The usee then held the equitable 
title and could convey it . . . . Under this system of uses, wills of land could be made, as 
the use was not considered as land, though it was the only valuable feature of it.”). 
201. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 589. 
202. TRAWICK, supra note 176, at app A § 1:3. 
203. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 274. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 275. 
208. See id. 
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and powerful charitable corporation called “Queen Anne’s Bounty.”209  
“Queen Anne’s Bounty” had a decidedly religious purpose.  The queen, 
who pressured parliament to enact the legislation, sought to rebuild and 
strengthen the church in the wake of the Reformation.
210
  To that end, 
“Queen Anne’s Bounty” earmarked certain tax revenue to be used to 
support the clergy of the Church of England.
211
 
England generally moved towards a system allowing greater 
testamentary freedom.
212
  Fraud, however, soon posed a serious threat to 
that freedom.  Prior to enactment of the Statute of Frauds of 1677, 
testaments conveying real property only needed to be written;
213
 they did 
not require the signature of the testator or witness.
214
  Testaments 
conveying only personal property could be oral.
215
  In 1666, when the 
Fire of London  destroyed real estate records and the plague caused an 
inordinate number of deaths, this legislative scheme proved disastrous.
216
  
Real estate fraud was rampant.
217
  Without the signature of the testator or 
disinterested witnesses, it was virtually impossible to determine whether 
a purported testament was the actual will of the testator.
218
  The Statute 
of Frauds of 1677 largely remedied this problem.
219
  Under the new law, 
testaments conveying real property had to be in writing, signed by the 
testator, and attested to before several disinterested witnesses.
220
  
Testaments conveying only personal property were subject to a less 
onerous form, but generally required a written instrument.
221
 
While charitable giving and testamentary freedom gained popular 
and legal support, family protection measures lost some ground.
222
  By 
the 1700s, England had abandoned the laws and customs reserving a 
 
209. See Mary F. Radford, The Case Against the Georgia Mortmain Statute, 8 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 313, 321 (1992). 
210. See Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 275. 
211. See id.; Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the 
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2147 (2002). 
212. See McMurray, supra note 187, at 110; Dainow, supra note 189, at 342. 
213. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. 
REV. 541, 547-48 (1990). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 550-52 (1990). 
217. Id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See McMurray, supra note 187, at 110; Dainow, supra note 189, at 342. 
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portion of the testator’s property for his wife and children.223  It is not 
entirely clear why England abolished these family protection 
mechanisms.
224
  Certainly, women and children remained dependent on 
their husbands and fathers for support and protection.  The major 
continental legal systems all retained some portion of a testator’s estate 
for his wife and children—making the English abandonment of that 
approach even more unusual.
225
 
The popularity of the church and clergy eventually waned again and 
England decided to recalibrate the competing public policies.
226
  Just a 
few years after its enactment, “Queen Anne’s Bounty” was harshly 
criticized as upsetting the recently restored balance of power between the 
church and the state.
227
  In the absence of any limiting statute or custom, 
people grew concerned that testators would make improvident charitable 
bequests from their deathbeds to the church.
228
  Amid this renewed anti-
clergy sentiment, the English Parliament enacted the so-called Modern 
Law of Mortmain in 1736 (the “Mortmain Act”).229  The Mortmain Act 
took a different approach from the earlier mortmain statutes by explicitly 
prohibiting testamentary bequests of land to charities, as well as 
nullifying inter vivos transfers of land to charities when made within 
twelve months of the donor’s death.230  Any nullified or prohibited 
transfer simply reverted to the donor’s heirs.231  The motivations behind 
the Mortmain Act are somewhat unclear.  Some legislative history 
suggests that the Mortmain Act was aimed at preventing property from 
being removed from commerce.
232
  The express language of the 
Mortmain Act explained that its purpose was to prevent testators from 
making improvident death bed transfers of property to charities to the 
detriment of their own families.
233
  However, “[i]t is probable that the 
anti-clerical feeling was the most important, though unstated, reason for 
 
223. McMurray, supra note 187, at 110. 
224. See Dainow, supra note 189, at 342-44. 
225. See McMurray, supra note 187, at 110-11. 
226. See Oosterhoff, supra note 178 at 280; Sherman, supra note 22, at 595. 
227. Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268. 
228. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 273; Sherman, supra note 22, 
at 595; Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268. 
229. Sherman, supra note 22, at 595; Bristowe, supra note 181, at 268. 
230. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 597. 
231. See id. 
232. See Oosterhoff, supra note 179, at 278; Bristowe, supra note 181 at 268 
233. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 281. 
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the act.”234  In any event, English law sought to find the appropriate 
balance between freedom of testation, family protection, and charitable 
bequests. 
Similar experiences with the church unfolded elsewhere in Western 
Europe.
235
  Over time however, most countries, including England, 
repealed their mortmain statutes.
236
  In England, repeal occurred first in a 
piecemeal fashion in the early 1900s.
237
  By the 1950s, when England re-
examined its mortmain statutes in a more comprehensive manner, the 
mortmain laws had so many exceptions that they mainly served to 
complicate law.
238
  In Parliament’s view, mortmain statutes were no 
longer needed or well suited for protecting testamentary freedom and 
family protection. Rather, by this era “the influence of the clergy had 
been greatly undermined” and other existing laws could protect against 
overreaching by the church.
239
  
 
C.  Mortmain in the United States 
 
Early American jurisdictions greatly valued testamentary freedom 
as the fundamental principle of wills.
240
  This policy continues today.  In 
recent years, American courts have described the freedom of testation as 
a “fundamental concept”241 and a “specifically expressed constitutional 
property right.”242  The American colonies did not, however, import the 
English mortmain statutes.  “[T]he English mortmain statutes were never 
thought to be in force in this country unless they had been legislatively 
adopted.”243 Many American jurisdictions did enact their own mortmain 
statutes.  A few states apparently shared the traditional concern that 
excessive property ownership by religious organizations took property 
 
234. Id. at 280. 
235. Id. at 271. 
236. Id. at 271-72, 291-92. 
237. See id. at 291. 
238. Id. at 293. 
239. Oosterhoff, supra note 178, at 295. 
240. See Jeffery M. Alden, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric 
Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (1966); Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the 
Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 194-98 (2012); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving 
and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 149-50 (2008).. 
241. Breeden v. Stone, 992 P.2d 1167, 1170 (2000). 
242. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68. (Fla. 
1990). 
243. Osnes v. Morris, 298 S.E.2d 803, 810 (W. Va. 1982); accord Perin v. Carey, 
65 U.S. 465 (1860). 
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out of commerce.  These states enacted laws restricting the amount of 
property that a religious group or charity could own.
244
  The more 
common concern, however, was protecting testators and their families 
from overreaching by religious groups.
245
  To that end, some statutes 
sought to balance the competing interests of family protection and 
freedom of testation.  As Justice Story explained, the purpose of these 
statutes was: 
 
to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious 
and feeble minds in their last moments, and to check an 
unfortunate propensity (which is sometimes found to 
exist under a bigoted fanaticism), the desire to acquire 
fame as a religious devotee and benefactor at the 
expense of all the natural claims of blood, and parental 
duty.
246
 
 
The American statutes took a variety of approaches.  One approach 
simply invalidated all testamentary bequests to charity if made within a 
certain period before death.
247
  Others placed a limit on the amount of 
property a testator could leave to a charity in his will, particularly if he 
was survived by a wife or children.
248
  Some states used a combination of 
the two approaches.
249
  The mortmain statutes eventually proved 
unworkable.  Percentage limitation mortmain statutes posed valuation 
problems, particularly when the testator owned property in more than 
one state.
250
  Some statutes were easily circumvented through careful 
 
244. Kristine S. Knaplund, Charity for the “Death Tax”: The Impact of Legislation 
on Charitable Bequests, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 713, 722-23 (2009).  These states included 
Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Virginia, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma. 
245. See, e.g., In re Estate of French, 365 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1976) (“Mortmain 
statutes in general are intended to protect a donor’s family from disinheritance due to 
charitable gifts made either without proper deliberation or as a result of undue influence 
on the part of the beneficiaries.”); In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 175 (Mont. 
1980) (“[T]he purpose was two-fold, namely to prevent overreaching by charities and to 
protect the interests of relatives.”). 
246. Stephenson v. Short, 92 N.Y. 433, 444 (1883) (citing another source). 
247. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§9.7 cmt. b (2003). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 605-08.  See generally G. Stanley Joslin, 
Conflicts of Laws Problems Raised by “Modern Mortmain Acts,” 60 DICK. L. REV. 7 
(1955). 
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drafting.
251
  Moreover, Americans did not necessarily object to all 
testamentary bequests to charity.
252
  Indeed, testamentary freedom 
remained a valued principle, as did charitable giving.
253
  Americans were 
concerned, however, that dependent family members be protected from 
disinheritance and that testators be protected from overreaching or undue 
influence on the part of charities.
254
  The problem with the mortmain 
statutes was that, while aimed at both of these concerns, they were both 
over and under-inclusive.  The statutes were over-inclusive because they 
voided “many intentional bequests by testators who were not 
impermissibly influenced or who [did] not have immediate family 
members in need of protection.”255  The statutes were also under-
inclusive because they did not “affect many charitable gifts made without 
proper deliberation,” nor did they “void legacies to persons who are in an 
equal position with religious persons to influence a testator.”256  In 
response to mounting dissatisfaction with mortmain statutes, some states 
repealed their statutes voluntarily.  In other states, courts held the statutes 
unconstitutional on a number of grounds, including the equal 
protection
257
 and due process clauses of state and federal constitutions
258
 
and state constitutional property guarantees.
259
  A few lower courts held 
mortmain statutes unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds,
260
 but 
higher courts generally declined to address that issue.
261
  By 1975 
mortmain statutes remained in only eleven states.
262
  In 1998 the last 
remaining mortmain statute—Georgia’s—was repealed.263 
The mortmain statutes “were repealed because they were 
 
251. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 605-08. 
252. See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 69-70. 
(Fla. 1990). 
253. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 240 at 180, 194-98. 
254. See Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69. 
255. Id at 70 (quoting another source). 
256. Id. (quoting another source). 
257. See Shriners’ Hospital for Crippled Children v. Hester, 492 N.E.2d 153, 157 
(Ohio 1986); Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69. 
258. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 609. 
259. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69. 
260. See Cunningham, supra note 182, at 75-76. 
261. See, e.g., Hester, 492 N.E.2d at 157 (“Based upon this holding we decline to 
address Shriners’ challenge . . . under the Free Exercise Clauses of the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions.”). 
262. Cunningham, supra note 182, at 51; Sherman, supra note 22, at 582. 
263. See Sherman, supra note 22, at 582; 2 DANIEL F. HINKEL, GEORGIA REAL 
ESTATE LAW & PROCEDURE §16-33.1 ( 6th ed.). 
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unworkable, not because they were unnecessary.”264  Yet the mortmain 
statutes were not replaced with any particular legislation better tailored to 
address the problem.  Rather, it seems states were confident that the 
existing law of undue influence provided adequate safeguards.
265
  The 
doctrine of undue influence had emerged in both England and the United 
States by the early 1800s.
266
  Initially, the doctrine was rather narrow and 
required proof of coercion or fraud.
267
  Over time, courts liberalized the 
doctrine and expanded its scope.
268
  By the time states began to abandon 
their mortmain laws, the law of undue influence was firmly established 
and increasingly robust.  Many states assumed that the law of undue 
influence could sufficiently protect testators and their families.  That has 
not been the case. 
 
IV.   The Non-Profit Sector Today 
 
“Americans have long been, and continue to be, a famously 
charitable people.”269 Charity plays an important—but complicated— 
role in this country.  Beginning in the colonial period, charities provided 
important services that the government was unable or unwilling to 
provide.
270
  The charitable sector today is a mix of secular and religious 
organizations.  When considered as a whole, however, the sector does 
bear some resemblance in terms of size, power, and benefits to the 
church of the past. 
 
A. Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector 
 
 
264. Sherman, supra note 22, at 582. 
265. Id. 
266. WILL CONTESTS, supra note 16, at § 2:8. 
267. See Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should 
be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 262 (2010). 
268. Id. 
269. Rob Reich & Christopher Wimer, Charitable Giving and the Great Recession, 
STAN. CENTER ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (Oct. 2012), available at 
https://www.stanford.edu/group/recessiontrends/cgibin/web/sites/all/themes/barron/pdf/C
haritableGiving_fact_sheet.pdf. 
270. See Barbara Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a 
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 558 (1998); Oliver A. 
Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1422-23 (1984); Irving G. Wyllie, The 
Search for an American Law of Charity, 1776-1844, 46 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 203, 
204-05 (1959). 
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The vast majority of Americans—anywhere from sixty-four271 to 
ninety-five percent
272—donate money to charity each year.  Since at least 
1956, total charitable giving in the United States has been equal to about 
two percent of total GDP,
273
 which is significantly higher than giving in 
any other country.
274
  In 2011, private charitable giving totaled an 
estimated $298.42 billion in the United States, which was actually a 
slight decrease from prior years.
275
 
In 2010, there were an estimated 2.3 million nonprofit organizations 
operating in the United States.
276
 These organizations include religious 
organizations, hospitals, educational organizations, colleges and 
universities, and organizations promoting arts, culture and humanities.
277
  
In 2010, these organizations collectively accounted for 9.2% of all wages 
and salaries paid in the U.S.
278
  Among those organizations required to 
file a financial return with the IRS, nonprofits reported $2.06 trillion in 
revenues and $4.49 trillion in assets for the 2010 tax year.
279
  In 2012, the 
nonprofit sector’s share of the national GDP was 5.5%.280 
 
B.  Legal and Economic Benefits Enjoyed by the Non-Profit Sector 
 
Charities enjoy a remarkably privileged position in American law.  
Legislation enacted at all levels of government confers considerable 
 
271. CHARITIES AID FOUNDATION, WORLD GIVING INDEX 2011, 15 (2011), available 
at 
http://www.cafamerica.org/dnn/Portals/0/World%20Giving%20Index%202011/World%2
0Giving%20Index%20main%20report%20for%20download.pdf. 
272. Eduardo Porter, Charity’s Role in America and its Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2012, at B1. 
273. GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2011, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21 (Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University 2012) 
[hereinafter GIVING USA]. 
274. See CHARITABLE AID FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF 
CHARITABLE GIVING 2 (Nov. 2006), available at  
https://www.cafonline.org/PDF/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20
Giving.pdf. 
275. Id. 
276. Amy S. Blackwood et al., The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, 
Giving, and Volunteering 2012, URBAN INSTITUTE (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. Blackwood, supra note 276. 
280. Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS 
(2012), available at http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm. 
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benefits on nonprofit organizations, benefits that often come at the 
expense of taxpayers.
281
  Perhaps the best-known legal and economic 
benefits afforded to charities are found in the tax arena.  At the federal 
level, qualifying nonprofit organizations are exempt from the income 
tax.
282
  Donors to nonprofit organizations receive their own tax benefits, 
including income tax deductions
283
 and gift and estate tax exemptions.
284
  
Nonprofits with employees receive additional benefits.  In addition to the 
tax-deferred retirement and pension plans available to for-profit 
organizations, nonprofit organizations have more options in the form of 
403(b) plans and section 457 plans.
285
  Nonprofits are exempt from 
federal unemployment payroll taxes and some religious organizations 
may opt out of the social security system.
286
  Nonprofit organizations are 
also exempt from various federal excise taxes and are entitled to reduced 
postage rates.
287
  At the state level, religious and charitable organizations 
receive additional benefits in the form of exemptions from property taxes 
and sales and use taxes.
288
 
Tax benefits, however, are not the only legal and economic benefits 
afforded to nonprofit organizations by legislation.  A number of antitrust 
laws and regulations that apply to for-profit organizations do not apply to 
nonprofits.  “Schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, 
hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit” are exempt 
from the Robinson-Patman Act (prohibiting price discrimination) in 
some instances.
289
  Most nonprofits are exempt from the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition in 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce.”290  Nonprofit 
organizations are entitled to a few, but significant, exceptions from 
federal securities laws and copyright laws.
291
  Nonprofit organizations 
 
281. See, e.g., Michael A. Pagano, How Nonprofits Can End Up Becoming a Drain 
on City Budgets, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/11/how-nonprofits-can-end-
becoming-drain-city-budgets/3798/. 
282. See 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2012); Bucholtz, supra note 270, at 560-61. 
283. See 26 U.S.C.§ 170(c) (2012). 
284. Id. §§ 2055, 2522. 
285. Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit 
Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 98-99 (1993). 
286. Id. at 99-103. 
287. Id. at 103, 112-14. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 105-06. 
290. Id. at 106. 
291. Id. at 107-11. 
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cannot be placed in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.
292
  In the 
labor and employment context, some nonprofit organizations are exempt 
from the National Labor Relations Act and, in some instances, religious 
organizations are exempt from anti-discrimination and civil rights 
laws..
293
  Nonprofit organizations are exempt from a variety of criminal 
laws including federal conflict of interest crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 207, 
federal anti-bribery laws, and gambling related criminal law 
exemptions.
294
  Many of these federal benefits have state level 
equivalents.
295
 
 
C. Policy Justifications for Legal and Economic Benefits Afforded to 
Charities 
 
Without question, nonprofits are favored as a matter of public 
policy.  A good deal of scholarship has considered this public policy in 
the economic and tax policy context.  Scholars point out that the 
multitude of tax benefits conferred on nonprofit organizations and their 
donors amounts to a subsidy or government expenditure for the benefit 
of these organizations.
296
 Several popular explanations justify the 
charitable subsidy. The traditional justification is that “subsidizing 
charities is ‘good’ because of the benefits they provide.”297  Specifically, 
“charities relieve the government of burdens it would otherwise have to 
bear, such as poverty relief.”298 Charities “counter[] governmental power 
and enhance[] pluralism,” “offer[] alternative viewpoints in arts and 
culture” and “provide[] creative and diverse solutions to society’s 
problems . . . .”299 A newer, and increasingly popular justification 
contends that, “subsidizing charities is necessary to help them provide 
good or services that would otherwise be under-produced due to various 
market and governmental failures.”300  The nonprofit sector—and the 
 
292. Id. at 112. 
293. Id. at 116-17. 
294. Id. at 117-29. 
295. Id. 
296. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable 
Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 609-13 (2011) [hereinafter Fleischer, Equality of 
Opportunity]. 
297. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable 
Giving, 93 MINN. L. REV. 165, 183 (2008) [hereinafter Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?]. 
298. Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 296, at 610. 
299. Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?, supra note 297, at 183. 
300. Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 296, at 611. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/1
CARTER - FINAL  
2014] TIPPING THE SCALES 1019 
subsidies it receives—has been both applauded and criticized in recent 
years for a variety of reasons.
301
  Although these critiques are obviously 
important, they fail to consider the wisdom of this public policy in the 
context of the individual testator. 
 
D.  Non-Profits & Testamentary Bequests 
 
Testamentary bequests play an important role in the financial plans 
of non-profit organizations.
302
  Many nonprofit organizations are looking, 
in part, to the Baby Boomer wealth transfer as an important source of 
funding.
303
  In their view “[t]he downturn is not going to keep people 
from dying, and it is not going to keep a wealth transfer from 
occurring.”304  Bequest giving already accounts for an important source 
of funding in the non-profit sector.  It is estimated that testamentary 
bequests account for about 8% of total annual charitable giving.
305
  In 
2011, that 8% amounted approximately $24.41 million.
306
 
At 8%, testamentary bequests represent a small, yet significant, 
portion of overall yearly giving.  That figure is actually more impressive 
than it might seem at first glance.  Approximately 2.5 million people died 
in the U.S. in 2011.
307
  Of those 2.5 million, approximately forty-six 
percent died without significant financial assets rendering them unable to 
 
301. See generally, Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. 
REV. 501 (1990); Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of 
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873 (1997); Bucholtz, supra note 270, at 555.; Fleischer, 
Equality of Opportunity, supra note 296, at 601; Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?, supra 
note 298, at 165; Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of 
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437 (2005); Lloyd Hitoshi 
Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of Autonomy, 
65 VAND. L. REV. 51 (2012); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good With the 
Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications 
for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV.  977 (2010). 
302. See e.g. Bartholomew A. Seymour, III, How to Market Planned Giving to 
Donors, 22 NONPROFIT WORLD, No. 6 at 7 (2004). 
303. See Howard Husock, The Fiscal Cliff Deal: Charity Takes a Hit, FORBES, (Jan. 
3, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardhusock/2013/01/03/the-fiscal-
cliff-deal-charity-takes-a-hit/. 
304. Morais, supra note 8 (quoting another source). 
305. GIVING USA, supra note 273, at 8. 
306. Id. 
307. Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, 61 NAT’L 
VITAL STAT. REP. No. 6, at 2 (Oct. 10, 2012) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf. 
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leave a bequest to anyone.
308
  Presumably then, the $24.41 million in 
charitable bequests came in the form of a small number of rather large 
bequests to charity.  Indeed, there is a significant gap between the 
number of Americans who donate to charity during life and the number 
of Americans who give money at death.
309
  Although most Americans 
donate to charity during life, only eight percent of Americans name 
charities in their estate plans.
310
  Interestingly, that eight percent figure is 
comparable to findings in the United Kingdom
311
 and Australia.
312
  In the 
view of charities and planned giving professionals, that eight percent 
figure translates into a “giving channel” with “untapped potential” to 
“yield additional gifts.”313  The nonprofit sector is expending 
considerable resources studying donors in order to “add to the body of 
knowledge about how fund raisers can enhance the number of bequests 
given to charitable organizations.”314 
 
1.  How Charities Solicit Testamentary and Other Gifts: The Planned     
Giving Campaign 
 
The typical planned giving campaign involves three key steps.  
First, the charity collects data on its existing inter vivos donors.  Second, 
the charity analyzes that data to identify the most likely charitable 
bequest donors—or “prospects.”315  Third, the charity directs a 
 
308. James M. Poterba et al., Were They Prepared for Retirement? Financial Status 
at Advanced Ages in the HRS and Ahead Cohorts, 40 (NBER Working Papers NO. 17824, 
2012). 
309. See Emily Krauser, Demographics and Motivations of Potential and Actual 
Donors, CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY IND. U., 14 (Mar. 2007) available at 
http://www.campbellcompany.com/Portals/22807/docs/Bequest%20Donors%20Full%20
Report%20with%20Exec%20Summary.pdf. 
310. Id. 
311. John Micklewright et al., Charitable Bequests and Wealth at Death 13 (Inst. 
For Study of Lab., Discussion Paper No. 7014, 2012) (estimating that “6 per cent of 
deaths in Britain in 2007 resulted in a charitable bequest.”). 
312. Diana Olsberg & Mark Winters, Ageing in Place: Intergenerational and 
Intrafamilial Housing Transfers and Shifts in Later Life 76 (Austl. Hous. & Urb. Res. 
Inst., Final Rep. No. 88, 2005) (Of the 96.2% of respondents reporting having made a 
will, 7.1% reported making bequests to a charity, church or institution.). 
313. See Krauser, supra note 309, at 11. 
314. Id. 
315. See Lawrence Henze, How The Right Marketing Strategies Can Enhance Your 
Planned Giving Program, BLACKBAUD (Apr. 2011), 
https://www.blackbaud.com/files/resources/downloads/WhitePaper_TargetAnalytics_Pla
nnedGiving.pdf (“If you have done the data mining, and you know the best individuals 
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multifaceted marketing campaign at those donors.  Each step in this 
process is sophisticated, aggressive, backed in actual research, and 
largely exempt from legal regulation. 
 
a. Data Collection 
 
The first step in any planned giving campaign is to identify potential 
testamentary donors.  Charities are able to collect, utilize, and share this 
data on their current donors, clients, alumni, members, and potential 
donors with little governmental regulation.  The privacy laws and 
regulations that protect consumer information in the for-profit context do 
not usually apply to nonprofit organizations.
316
  Nonprofit fundraisers are 
free to engage in practices—like telephone solicitations—that are 
prohibited in the commercial context.
317
  Charities, particularly the large 
ones, collect all sorts of information about their donors and potential 
donors.  Once an organization has some very basic information about a 
person in their database—like a name and address—they can conduct 
formal research—either in house or with the help of a research 
company—to add to that information. 
Suppose I decide to donate ten dollars to a charity using the link on 
its website.  In order to pay by credit card, the charity will require me to 
provide my full name, billing address, and phone number.
318
  Many 
nonprofits will require additional information such as an e-mail address.  
Knowing only my name and address, a researcher can discover all sorts 
of information about me, often for free.  If the charity wanted to 
determine whether I was a likely charitable bequest donor, then the 
charity might want to know my age, marital status, number and ages of 
children (if any), education, religious affiliation, income, and net 
worth.
319
  The salaries of state and federal employees are often public 
information. For other potential donors, income and net worth may be 
approximated.  Several pieces of data can indicate wealth: an expensive 
home, other real estate holdings like vacation homes, a high paying 
occupation, owning a luxury car, owning a boat, having an expensive 
 
most likely to make charitable bequests . . . you may effectively target the annual reports 
and newsletters.”). 
316. See generally Ely R. Levy & Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Fundraising and 
Consumer Protection: A Donor’s Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 519 (2004). 
317. See id. 
318. See, e.g., AMERICAN RED CROSS, www.redcross.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
319. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
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hobby, frequent travel, and inherited wealth.
320
  Knowing just my name 
and address, the charity can quickly uncover most of this information.  
By visiting anybirthday.com the researcher can input my name, city, and 
state and determine my age. The researcher can use my name and 
address to search the local property records to see if I own my house, its 
value, and if I have a mortgage.  The property record might also reveal 
my marital status.  Knowing only my name and address, the researcher 
can quickly discover whether I have made any political contributions 
since 1980.
321
  If so, the researcher will also learn the dates, amounts, and 
recipients of the contribution, as well as my occupation.
322
 
Facebook, Twitter, Linked In, and other social media sites are a 
goldmine of information.
323
  Depending on my privacy settings, the 
researcher may be able to determine my marital status, sexual 
orientation, race, whether I have children, their approximate ages, my 
education, employer, hobbies, interests, recent illnesses, recent travel, 
and a myriad of additional information.  All of the information just 
described can be obtained for free, online, with just a few minutes worth 
of research.  Already the researcher has obtained the data necessary to 
see whether I meet a number of the demographic markers of a likely 
charitable bequest donor.
324
  Of course, the researcher could do a little 
more work and discover even more information about me relevant to 
charitable bequests.  For example, the researcher may be able to 
determine my actual salary, my pattern of charitable giving to other 
organizations, my social and professional affiliations, and my private 
business holdings. 
 
b.  Analyzing the Data 
 
A growing body of research identifies the characteristics of living 
donors who make charitable bequests and explains the factors that 
motivate those bequests.  Most lifetime donors do not leave money to 
charity at death.
325
  One study found that 90.6% of donors who gave at 
 
320. See The Donor Cultivation System 2, PUB. BROAD. MAJOR GIVING INITIATIVE, 
http://majorgivingnow.org/downloads/pdf/cultivation_system.pdf. 
321. See, e.g., POLITICAL MONEY LINE, http://www.politicalmoneyline.com (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
322. Id. 
323. See Somini Sengupta, Staying Private on the New Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
7, 2013), at B1. 
324. See POLITICAL MONEY LINE, supra note 321. 
325. Russell N. James, III, Health, Wealth, and Charitable Estate Planning: A 
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least $500 to a charity during life, did not leave any money to charity at 
death.
326
  The decision to donate money during life apparently involves a 
different decision-making process than the decision to leave money at 
death.  A recent functional MRI study revealed that deciding to leave a 
charitable bequest involved a different brain region than the decision to 
donate money or time during life.
327
  Researchers are working to identify 
the differences in that decision making process in order to convert 
lifetime donors into bequest donors.  Studies consistently show that 
family makeup is strongly related to whether a person will leave a 
charitable bequest.  Testators who are married or who have children or 
grandchildren are generally less likely to make charitable bequests.
328
  
However, parents appear more likely to leave charitable bequests when 
their children have higher incomes of their own.
329
  Although it appears 
that “no other indicator is a [sic] strong as childlessness,” other 
demographic factors are important.
330
  The likelihood of making a 
charitable bequest increases with education level, with graduate degree 
holders being the most likely to leave a charitable bequest.
331
  Being 
solicited by a charity for a bequest gift is positively associated with 
making a bequest gift.
332
  Other characteristics positively associated with 
making a charitable bequest include: volunteering for the charity, 
attending religious services, higher socioeconomic status, income, and 
previous cancer diagnosis.
333
 
 
c. Marketing Campaign 
 
Once the nonprofit identifies a pool of likely bequest donor 
 
Longitudinal Examination of Testamentary Charitable Giving Plans, 38 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1026, 1032 (2009). 
326. Id. 
327. Russell N. James, III & Michael W. O’Boyle, Charitable Estate Planning as 
Visualized Autobiography: An fMRI Study of Its Neural Correlates, NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/17/0899764012463121. 
328. See, e.g., James, supra note 325, at 1039 (“[T]he presence of children or 
grandchildren . . . was the most dominant factor in predicted charitable testamentary 
planning across all analyses.”). 
329. Id. at 1027. 
330. Id. at 1039. 
331. See James, supra note 325, at 1031; Krauser, supra note 309, at 26. 
332. Profile of a Bequest Giver, STELTER DONOR INSIGHT REP. 3-4 (2008), 
http://www.stelter.com/research-whitepapers/DIR-ProfileBequest.pdf. 
333. James, supra note 325, at 1030-34. 
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prospects, it will deploy a multifaceted marketing campaign soliciting a 
charitable bequest.  Marketing can help create desires that previously did 
not exist.
334
  The marketing campaign starts early; years before research 
suggests the prospect is likely to actually make the gift.
335
  Marketing 
campaigns often start with a variety of direct mailings, including post 
cards, newsletters, annual reports, and magazines.
336
  The direct mail is 
sent to a large group of potential donors with the knowledge that most of 
them will not actually respond to the direct mail.
337
  Rather, the direct 
mail campaign is intended to influence the prospects so that, “the ground 
is softer for the next promotion.”338  Post cards have the benefit of being 
inexpensive to produce and mail.  They also have higher readership rates 
than other forms of direct mail.
339
  Newsletters and magazines will 
generally include some “compelling donor stories that tug at the 
heartstrings of [the] audience . . . .”340 
Research suggests that one barrier to charitable bequests is people 
do not believe they are wealthy enough to make those gifts.
341
  To 
overcome that barrier, newsletters and magazines will include 
personalized stories about existing donors that are financially situated 
similarly to the prospect.
342
  The goal of these personal accounts is to 
“simply and effectively bring home the message to prospects through 
sharing living examples of people ‘just like them’ who were able to make 
personally-significant planned gifts.”343  The personal accounts have the 
 
334. See Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the 
Reproduction of Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 889 (2002) (book review). 
335. Seymour, supra note 302, at 7; Phyllis Freedman & Kathy Ward, Applying the 
Art & Science of Direct Marketing to Planned Giving (2010), http://www.smart-
giving.com/plannedgivingblogger/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Applying-the-Art-
Science-of-Direct-Marketing-to-Planned-Giving.pdf; see Katherine Swank & Michael 
Quevli, Prospect Research for Planned Gifts, BLACKBAUD (2011), 
https://www.blackbaud.com/files/resources/downloads/WhitePaper_ProspectResearchfor
PlannedGifts.pdf. 
336. See Henze, supra note 315.; Viken Mikaelian, Planned Giving Marketing 
Secrets Revealed, VIRTUAL GIVING (2013), http://plannedgiving.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2007/05/pgsecrets.pdf. 
337. See Gary Pforzheimer, Planned Giving Marketing: Benchmarking and 
Beyond, PG CALC. INC., 13 (2008),  http://www.pgcalc.com/pdf/Outline1150.pdf. 
338. Id. 
339. See, e.g., Mikaelian, supra note 336. 
340. Pforzheimer, supra note 337, at 13. 
341. See Henze, supra note 315, at 4. 
342. Id. at 4. 
343. Id. at 4; see also Pforzheimer, supra note 337, at 9-10.  For examples of these 
stories, see, e.g., Paul C. Lauterbur, Honoring Nobel Laureate Paul Lauterbur, 14 SIGMA 
XI TODAY 1, 95 (2005). 
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added benefit of convincing prospects that bequest giving is a social 
norm and is expected of them.
344
  “Studies show that people help more 
when they are exposed to role models who help, presumably because the 
model provides information about the social norms for and the 
consequences of helping.”345  The marketing campaign will also include 
events, e-mail, and a website.
346
  Once the ground is thoroughly 
“softened” the nonprofit will follow up with phone calls and personal 
visits.
347
  During the first visit the nonprofit’s representative will simply 
thank a prospect for a recent annual gift and try to find out more 
information about the prospect.
348
  The representative will then follow up 
with the prospect with meetings and phone calls and will eventually 
begin to broach the issue of a bequest gift.
349
 
Another perceived barrier to charitable bequests is convincing 
current inter vivos donors to execute a will.  A number of polls and 
studies estimate that anywhere from fifty to sixty-five percent of 
Americans do not have a will.
350
  Many people delay writing wills 
because of the cost
351
 and discomfort discussing death.
352
  Savvy 
nonprofits overcome this barrier by offering free estate planning 
 
344. See Neeli Bendapudi et al., Enhancing Helping Behavior: An Integrative 
Framework for Promotion Planning, 69 AM. J. MARKETING 33, 43 (1996). 
345. Id. (citations omitted). 
346. Pforzheimer, supra note 337, at 13-14. 
347. Id. at 18. 
348. LAWRENCE HENZE & KATHERINE SWANK, CREATING A LEGACY: BUILDING A 
PLANNED GIVING PROGRAM FROM THE GROUND UP 40-43 (2008). 
349. Id. 
350. See, e.g., Ashlea Ebeling, Americans Lack Basic Estate Plans, FORBES, March 
1, 2010, available at http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/01/estate-tax-living-will-schiavo-
personal-finance-no-estate-plans.html?boxes=Homepagechannels (finding only 35% of 
survey respondents had a will); Jenny Greenhough, 57% of Adults Don’t Have a Will—
Are You One of Them?, ROCKET LAWYER, March 31, 2011, available at 
http://blog.rocketlawyer.com/2011-wills-estate-planning-survey-95235; Gary Langer, 
Poll: Americans Not Planning for the Future, ABC NEWS, AUG. 26, 2012, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=86992&page=1#.UVNwHaWRjzI (finding 
fewer than 50% of respondents had a will). 
351. See Christine Dugas, Times Change Wills, Yet Many Americans Don’t Have 
One, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2012, available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/basics/story/2012-04-27/preparing-a-
will/54632436/1; Carole Fleck, Many Boomers Don’t Have Wills, Poll Finds, AARP 
BLOG, May 1, 2012, available at http://blog.aarp.org/2012/05/01/many-boomers-dont-
have-wills-poll-finds/. 
352. See Adrian Sargeant & Jen Shang, Identification, Death and Bequest Giving, 
REP. ON FUNDRAISING AND PHILANTHROPY 5-6 (Sept. 2008). 
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seminars and estate planning services to their donors and volunteers.
353
  
Consumer research suggests that we are highly motivated when offered 
something for free.
354
  Moreover, nonprofits seek to offer these services 
at key milestones when potential donors are most likely to write or re-
write a will: “births, marriages, retirements, [and] family members’ 
deaths.”355 
 
V.  Inadequate Restraints on Charitable Giving and Possible 
Solutions 
 
The existing rules aimed at ensuring testamentary freedom and 
family protection are poorly suited for protecting testators and their 
families from the overreaching of charities.  The few laws and reported 
decisions touching on the issue demonstrate a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how nonprofits today solicit testamentary bequests.  
They also illustrate how this misunderstanding has not only led to an 
imbalance, but also, to the potential exploitation of testators and their 
families by the nonprofit sector.  The problem is evident in several 
contexts. 
 
A.  Interested Parties 
 
The rule prohibiting an interested party from serving as a witness to 
a will or participating in its drafting serves an important function.  By 
prohibiting bequests to witnesses, the rule seeks to “preserve the integrity 
of the process of will executions by removing the possibility that 
attesting witnesses who receive a disposition under the will might give 
false testimony in support of the will to protect their legacies.”356  The 
requirement seeks “to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a 
 
353. See, e.g., Estate Planning Seminar Offered in Norman, THE JOURNAL RECORD, 
May 20, 2008; Joyce Gannon, Planned Giving Gets New Life: For Some, Recession 
Changes Approach to Charitable Donations, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 24, 2009; 
Homecoming Activities Begin at WVSU, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 2013; Love, 
supra note 8, at A20. 
354. See, e.g., Something Doesn’t Add Up, THE ECONOMIST, June 30, 2012, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21557801; Farnoosh Torabi, Pricing 
Psychology: 7 Sneaky Retail Tricks, CBS NEWS, April 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-41541822/pricing-psychology-7-sneaky-
retail-tricks/. 
355. Love, supra note 8, at A20. 
356. In re Estate of Morea, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1022-23 (Sur. Ct. 1996). 
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will to thwart the intention of the [testator].”357  For thousands of years 
this rule has sought to maintain the integrity of the testamentary process.  
In an effort to procure more property for itself, the church successfully 
eroded this requirement during the Middle Ages.
358
  Abuse was rampant 
and the public lost confidence in the church and the sanctity of the 
testamentary process.  Over time, the law again prohibited interested 
parties from serving as witnesses to wills or participating in their 
drafting.  In recent years, however, the strength of this rule has again 
waned.  “[T]he Uniform Probate Code [UPC] scrapped the requirement 
that witnesses be disinterested in the will.”359  According to the UPC’s 
official comment, “[t]he requirement of disinterested witnesses has not 
succeeded in preventing fraud and undue influence; and in most cases of 
undue influence, the influencer is careful not to sign as a witness, but to 
procure disinterested witnesses.”360  The comment further explains that, 
“attorneys will continue to use disinterested witnesses in the execution of 
wills.”361  This view, which a number of respected scholars share,  is 
misplaced.  When interested parties are intimately involved in the 
testamentary process, it casts a cloud over the legitimacy of the entire 
process and undermines public confidences.  The ability of an heir to 
bring an undue influence claim does absolutely nothing to remedy that 
harm.  If anything, increased litigation over testaments exacerbates that 
harm.  Undue influence claims are notoriously difficult to prove—
particularly where the primary witnesses to the testamentary process 
have an incentive to give self-serving testimony.  Undue influence cases 
are expensive and can rip a family apart in the process.  The UPC’s faith 
that attorneys will exercise good judgment in selecting witnesses is sadly 
misplaced.
362
  Moreover, the UPC seems to presuppose that the 
influencer has a malicious intent to defraud the testator and will take 
steps to cover his tracks.  That is not necessarily true—particularly in the 
 
357. In re Estate of Johnson, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); accord 
In re Estate of Small, 346 F. Supp. 600, 600-01 (D.D.C. 1972) (“The evident purpose was 
to give maximum effect to wills and at the same time to eliminate any financial incentive 
which might taint the necessary objectivity of the attesting witness.”). 
358. See supra Part III. 
359. Lindgren, supra note 213, at 561. 
360. Unif. Probate Code § 2-505 cmt (1969). 
361. Id. 
362. See, e.g., Small, 346 F. Supp. at 601; Herman v. Kogan, 487 So. 2d 48, 48 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Estate of Meskimen, 235 N.E.2d 619, 624 (Ill. 1968); 
Berndtson v. Heuberger, 173 N.E.2d 460, 461 (Ill. 1961); In re Estate of Schroeder, 441 
N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Burke v. Kehr, 876 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Estate of Carano, 868 P. 2d 699, 702 (Okla. 1994). 
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case of charitable bequests.
363
  When the representative of a charity 
improperly procures a bequest for a charity, does that necessarily make 
him a bad actor?  More likely, he is either doing his job as part of the 
organization’s fundraising team or he is genuinely interested in the 
success of the charity.  Undoubtedly, many, if not most, members of the 
clergy in the MiddleAges were similarly motivated and they did not 
attempt to conceal their involvement in the testamentary process.  Their 
intimate involvement in the testamentary process, however, harmed 
testators, testators’ families, and the church and undermined public 
confidence in the entire process. 
Today, the scope of the problem varies by jurisdiction.  A number 
of states continue to require disinterested witnesses and scriveners.  
Courts, however, often decline to apply those laws in the context of 
charitable bequest. 
 
1.  Refusal of Courts to Apply the Existing Disinterested Witness 
Rule to Charities 
 
A number of jurisdictions continue to expressly prohibit an 
interested party from serving as a witness.  These jurisdictions, by 
statute, impose a variety of penalties—the thrust of which is to typically 
deny a bequest made to a witness.  In practice, courts tend to interpret the 
statutes as requiring a direct pecuniary benefit to the witness.
364
  Relying 
on the direct pecuniary interest requirement, some courts have refused to 
apply these statutes in the charitable bequest context.  Courts essentially 
draw a dividing line between the charitable organization itself and its 
members and representatives reasoning that a witness’ membership in 
the charitable organization does not void a bequest to that charity 
“because the member’s interest is too indirect to be a disqualifying 
interest . . . .”365  In some cases, this approach makes sense.  For 
example, In re Will of Potter involved a charitable bequest to the town of 
 
363. It appears that courts also share this unfounded view. See, e.g., In re Estate of 
Hamm, 262 N.W.2d 201, 206-07 (S.D. 1979) (“[I]f Baldwin were the blackguard that the 
contestants paint him he would have deleted all reference to the Home and assured 
himself of the trusteeship with all of the increments and fees attended thereto.”). 
364. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wolfner, 188 N.E.2d 712, 714 (Ill. 1963) (“The 
interest which disqualifies a witness must be such an interest in the will that a pecuniary 
gain or loss will come to him directly as the immediate result of is provisions.”); 
Triestman v. Kilgore, 838 S.W.2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (“A competent witness to a will 
is one who receives no pecuniary benefit under its terms.”). 
365. In re Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
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Pawlet for upkeep of roads and bridges.
366
  All three witnesses to the will 
were residents of the town and taxpayers, and, therefore, would all 
benefit from the charitable bequest.
367
  If the court had strictly applied 
the disinterested witness requirement, then, presumably, no one in the 
town could serve as a witness—an obviously absurd result.  Rather, the 
court reasoned that “[n]o one of the witnesses to this will had a fixed, 
certain, and vested pecuniary interest in the will, and so no one of them 
was incompetent because of that interest.”368 
Courts consistently refuse to apply the applicable statute even where 
the witnesses’ interest in the charitable bequest is more direct and the 
witnesses have an obvious interest in the outcome of the will.  Estate of 
Tkachuk illustrates this point.
369
  In that case the decedent wrote a will 
leaving the bulk of his property to the church.
370
  At the decedent’s 
request, Reverend Myczka typed the decedent’s will, accompanied the 
decedent to a notary’s office, and signed as a witness to the will.371  
Reverend Myczka was employed by the church and served as an officer, 
treasurer, and member of the executive committee.
372
  The decedent’s 
brother later challenged the bequest to the church under an existing 
statute that invalidated bequests to subscribing witnesses.
373
  The court 
conceded that the Reverend Myczka was not an entirely disinterested 
witness in light of his position as an officer of the church.
374
  However, 
the court upheld the bequest to the church reasoning that the language of 
the statute “does not void gifts to a beneficiary where one of the 
subscribing witnesses, who is not a beneficiary, is interested in the 
bequest.”375  The court construed the language of the applicable statute 
narrowly and reasoned that the bequest in question was to the church, not 
Reverend Myczka.
376
 
Some courts go further and uphold the testament even when the 
 
366. In re Will of Potter, 95 A. 646, 647 (Vt. 1915). 
367. Id. 
368. Id. 
369. In re Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); accord In re 
Estate of Jordan, 519 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975); In re Estate of Giacomini, 603 
P.2d 218 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979). 
370. In re Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 56. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. at 56-57. 
374. Id. at 56. 
375. Id. at 56-57. 
376. Id. at 57. 
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witness does receive a direct pecuniary benefit.  In these cases, the courts 
reason that the pecuniary benefit involved is not the type of benefit 
envisioned by the statute.  Estate of Giacomini illustrates this 
approach.
377
  Robert Davis, an attorney prepared the decedent’s will, 
which left the bulk of her estate to several charitable beneficiaries.
378
  
Mr. Davis, who was also a subscribing witness to the will, stood to 
receive a number of pecuniary benefits.
379
  The will named Mr. Davis as 
executor, without bond, and gave him the power to employ his own law 
firm and to pay the firm without prior court approval.
380
  Further, Mr. 
Davis held positions with two of the charitable beneficiaries—serving as 
a member of the board of trustees of one organization, and on the fund-
raising advisory council of the other.
381
  Yet, the court held that Mr. 
Davis did not stand to benefit from the will and could therefore serve as a 
witness without any consequences.
382
  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court reasoned that his appointment as executor was not the type of 
pecuniary interest that would disqualify him as a witness because it only 
entitled him to be compensated for labor he would perform in a fiduciary 
capacity.
383
 
Courts should construe these statutes more broadly and jurisdictions 
that have adopted the UPC approach should reconsider.  In a case like 
that of Reverend Myczka, the court should not draw a distinction 
between the charity’s representative and the charity itself.  Because a 
charity can only act through its representatives, that distinction is 
nonsensical.  When a charity’s representative is intimately involved in 
the drafting and execution of a testament, it casts doubt on the integrity 
of the entire process.  Voiding bequests under such circumstances serves 
as a meaningful deterrent and can help avoid the harm associated with 
subsequent undue influence litigation.  The direct pecuniary interest 
requirement, as illustrated in Giacomini, should likewise be interpreted 
more broadly.  The fact that Mr. Davis was an attorney and that his 
sizeable pecuniary interest in the estate and its administration required 
him to perform services does not remove the taint of the impropriety of 
his actions.  Indeed, those very facts tend to undermine public confidence 
 
377. In re Estate of Giacomini, 603 P.2d 218 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); accord LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. arts. 1581-83 (2013). 
378. In re Estate of Giacomini, 603 P.2d at 219. 
379. Id. 
380. Id. 
381. Id. 
382. See id. 
383. See id., at 220. 
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in the legal profession as a whole.
384
 
 
2.  Rules Requiring Disinterested Scrivener Inapplicable 
 
Most jurisdictions have no affirmative law prohibiting a party who 
prepares a will from benefitting under its terms.  The UPC is silent on the 
issue and many jurisdictions simply consider a benefit received by the 
drafter as a factor in an undue influence analysis.  This presents the exact 
same set of problems as allowing interested witnesses.  The few states 
that do address the issue by statute fail to adequately address interested 
scriveners in the charitable context.  For example, Kansas invalidates any 
“provision in a will, written or prepared for another person, that gives the 
writer or preparer or the writer’s or preparer’s parent, children, issue, 
sibling, or spouse any devise or bequest . . . .”385  The statute is simply 
inapplicable in the charitable context.  California goes somewhat further 
and imposes a presumption of fraud or undue influence with respect to 
bequests to the party who drafted the will or otherwise has a fiduciary or 
business relationship with the testator.
386
  Although the scope of the 
California prohibition is broad, nonprofit organizations are specifically 
excluded.
387
  In enacting the statutory exception benefiting non-profits, 
the legislature acknowledged the need to protect testators from the undue 
influence of fiduciaries.
388
  The legislature decided to exempt nonprofit 
organizations from the scope of the prohibition in order to encourage 
charitable bequests and “ensure that particular recipients of transfers are 
not disqualified as beneficiaries simply because they drafted the 
language of the transferring instrument.”389  This approach ignores the 
well-documented history of overreaching by the church in drafting 
testamentary instruments. 
In most jurisdictions, the only rule discouraging scriveners from 
preparing testaments in their own favor are the ethical rules governing 
the legal profession.  While these professional responsibility rules are 
 
384. See, e.g., Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning 
Practices—Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 83-88 (1984). 
385. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-605 (2013). 
386. CAL. PROB. CODE §21380 (2014). 
387. CAL. PROB. CODE §21382 (2014). 
388. Laura J. Fowler, Administration of Estates; Prohibition of Transfers of 
Property—Exception, 26 PAC. L. J. 272, 275 (1994) (this article refers to CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 21350, which has since been repealed and replaced with new lesgilation, CAL. PROB. 
CODE §§ 21380, 21382) . 
389. Id. 
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well founded, they are wholly insufficient.  Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.8(c) prevents a lawyer from soliciting a bequest for himself or 
his family and from preparing an instrument where he receives a 
bequest.
390
  Every jurisdiction has some comparable prohibition.  Rule 
1.8 is aimed, at(among other things) protecting testators from undue 
influence.
391
  The rule does not adequately protect testators from 
overreaching.
392
  In many jurisdictions, the rules of professional conduct 
do not have the force of law.
393
  In those jurisdictions, a violation of Rule 
1.8 will not render a testamentary bequest invalid and may not result in 
significant disciplinary action against the attorney.
394
  Even if a violation 
of Rule 1.8 does not invalidate a bequest, most jurisdictions would 
consider the violation as evidence supporting an undue influence 
claim.
395
  However, courts resist that approach in the charitable context 
and will apply the pecuniary interest analysis to determine that the 
attorney did not benefit from the charitable bequest.
396
  Moreover, the 
rules of professional responsibility do not apply to non-lawyers.  In a 
case like Tkachuk where the party drafting the will is not a lawyer, the 
drafting party is not bound by the rules of professional responsibility and 
cannot be punished for their violation.  With the availability of will 
drafting software, virtually anyone can draft a valid testament without 
the assistance of an attorney.
397
 
 
B.  Refusal of Courts to Apply Undue Influence in the Charitable Context 
 
Undue influence could provide a meaningful remedy from 
overreaching by charities and their representatives if courts were willing 
 
390. See MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983).. 
391. Id. 
392. See Johnston, supra note 384, at 83-84. 
393. Louisiana appears to be an exception to this view.  See Succession of Parham, 
755 So. 2d 265, 270 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct . 
. . have the force and effect of substantive law.”). 
394. See Sandford v. Probate Appeal, Nos. CV-05-4005186-S, CV-05-4005187-S, 
2008 WL 544439 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2008); In re Will of Cromwell, 552 N.Y.S.2d 
480, 482 (Sur. Ct. 1989); In re Estate of Pedrick, 482 A.2d 215, 218 (Pa. 1984); In re 
Bloch, 625 A.2d 57, 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
395. See Kirschbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1302 (Ohio 1991). 
396. See Knowlton v. Schultz, 902 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
397. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(pastor used computer software to prepare testament benefitting himself).  See generally 
Wendy S. Geoffe & Rochelle L. Haller, From Zoom to Doom? Risks of Do-It-Yourself 
Estate Planning, ESTATE PLANNING (Apr. 2011). 
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to apply the law in the charitable context.  Yet, courts consistently refuse 
to afford facts indicating undue influence appropriate evidentiary weight 
when a charity and its representatives are involved.  The problem is 
evident at nearly every stage of the undue influence analysis. 
 
1.  Confidential Relationship 
 
The existence of a confidential relationship is a threshold issue in 
most undue influence cases.  Courts have repeatedly found reliant-type 
confidential relationships where one person relies on another to select an 
attorney and provide financial guidance.
398
  A nonprofit whose 
representatives provide estate planning and similar financial services to 
donors should be held to that same standard. 
In furthering their planned giving campaigns, nonprofits routinely 
solicit their prospects to execute wills.
399
  A popular solicitation 
technique involves explaining the tax and economic benefits available to 
charitable bequest donors.
400
  Indeed, “the deductibility 
ofcharitablebequests enhances the attractiveness of leaving a portion of 
one’sestatetocharity.”401  Many planned giving officers themselves hold 
advanced degrees in law and accounting.  When the nonprofits are 
successful it is hardly surprising that the prospect may ask the 
nonprofit’s representative to suggest what attorney he should visit.  The 
representative will gladly do so, taking advantage of the special trust and 
confidence the donor has bestowed upon it, and will even foot the bill for 
the expense.  Some nonprofits address attorney recommendation 
situations proactively by retaining attorneys ahead of time so that they 
may offer estate-planning services to their prospects free of charge.  The 
relationship bears all the hallmarks of a confidential relationship, yet 
courts are hesitant to find a confidential relationship in a charitable 
bequest setting.  In the view of some courts, “it is not improper for 
charitable organizations to offer estate planning advice, including plans 
for charitable donations.”402 
I disagree. History amply illustrates the impropriety of the 
representatives of a charitable organization taking over the testamentary 
 
398. See Harris v. Jourdan, 180 P.3d 119, 132 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
399. See supra Part IV. 
400. See supra Part IV. 
401. B. Douglas Bernheim. Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, 1 TAX POLICY & 
ECONOMY, 113, 116 (1987), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10931.pdf. 
402. Estate of Davis v. Cook, 9 S.W.3d 288, 293-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). 
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process. When the representative of a charitable organization 
successfully solicits a testator to write a will naming the organization as a 
beneficiary, helps the testator select an attorney, and foots the bill for the 
services a confidential relationship exists and the courts should recognize 
this simple and obvious fact. The refusal or courts to find a confidential 
relationship in the charitable context is especially troubling because the 
existence of a confidential relationship is a threshold issue in many 
jurisdictions. Even in those jurisdictions that do not expressly require a 
finding of a confidential relationship, the existence of a confidential 
relationship strongly supports a finding of the other required elements of 
an undue influence claim. 
In Campbell, the testator, Mrs. Campbell, developed a close 
friendship with Mr. Upchurch, a university’s planning giving officer.403 
Mrs. Campbell sought Mr. Upchurch’s advice on arranging her long-
term financial and physical care.  After moving to property adjacent to 
the university, Mrs. Campbell asked Mr. Upchurch to recommend an 
attorney to help prepare her estate planning documents and to make an 
appointment for her. Mr. Upchurch not only located an attorney—the 
university’s general counsel—he attended the meetings with Ms. 
Campbell and corresponded with the attorney regarding Mrs. Campbell’s 
plans.  Mr. Upchurch even arranged for the university to pay the 
attorney’s bill.  Mrs. Campbell obviously had a relationship of trust and 
confidence with Mr. Upchurch.  However, the court was unwilling to 
rule that Mr. Upchurch and, in turn, the university, had a confidential 
relationship with Mrs. Campbell at the relevant time. 
In re Estate of Brevard presents a less sophisticated charity 
representative than Campbell, but is equally troubling.
404
  The testator, 
Ms. Brevard, allegedly asked Pastor Barlowe to help her prepare a 
testament.
405
  Pastor Barlowe and Ms. Brevard were friends, and she 
often attended his church.
406
  Pastor Barlowe purchased will drafting 
software and prepared Ms. Brevard’s testament for her.407  The testament 
named Pastor Barlowe as executor and his church as contingent 
beneficiary.
408
  Ms. Brevard’s relatives challenged her will on the 
 
403. In re Will of Campbell, 573 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
404. In re Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
405. Id. at 300. 
406. Id. 
407. Id. 
408. Id. at 301. 
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grounds of undue influence.
409
  On appeal, one issue before the court was 
whether Pastor Barlow had a confidential relationship with Ms. 
Brevard.
410
  The court conceded that had Pastor Barlow been an actual 
attorney, he and Ms. Brevard would have had a confidential relationship, 
as a matter of law, when he prepared her will.
411
 However, the court was 
unwilling to extend that rule to a person engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.
412
  In the attorney-client context, “heightened scrutiny 
exists because attorneys’ superior knowledge of the law is assumed to 
give them an unfair advantage when conducting business transactions 
with clients.”413  However, the concern in the case of Pastor Barlow was 
different in the view of the court.  “The danger inherent in the 
unauthorized practice of law is not that the unauthorized practitioner will 
use superior legal knowledge to take advantage of a ‘client,’ but that the 
‘client’ will be harmed by the unauthorized practitioner’s lack of 
knowledge.”414  The court’s analysis completely misses the point.  The 
appropriate inquiry is whether a confidential relationship exists.  Where a 
non-attorney seeks to act as an attorney, he should be held to the same 
legal standard as an attorney. 
 
2.  Susceptibility, Opportunity, Disposition, and Coveted Result 
 
In addition to the existence of a confidential relationship, a finding 
of undue influence typically requires evidence of susceptibility, 
opportunity, disposition, and a coveted result.  A successful planned 
giving campaign bears the hallmarks of each of these factors, but courts 
often refuse to give this fact sufficient evidentiary weight. 
 
a.  Susceptibility 
 
In determining susceptibility, the court asks whether the testator was 
susceptible to the influence of the alleged influencer.
415
  The testator’s 
personal qualities are relevant.
416
  Illness,
417
 incapacity,
418
 old age,
419
 
 
409. Id. 
410. Id. at 303. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
415. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dejmal, 289 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Wis. 1980). 
416. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bandurski , 281 A.2d 621, 623 (Del. Ch.1971); 
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social isolation, declining mental abilities
420
 and similar factors all 
indicate of susceptibility.
421
  This vulnerable population is exactly the 
population targeted by nonprofit organizations for bequests because they 
are the most likely to make those bequests.  Planned giving campaigns 
are actually designed to make potential donors more susceptible to the 
suggestions of the nonprofit and its representatives.  Direct mailings and 
other early contacts with potential donors help cultivate desires and 
soften the ground long before the non-profit’s representative makes 
personal contact.  Once a non-profit’s representative actually contacts the 
testator personally, the testator is more likely to be receptive to the 
representative’s suggestions. 
Courts, however, are hesitant to recognize this susceptibility to 
influence in the charitable context.  In In re Estate of Osborn, the 
decedent left the bulk of her estate to the local Catholic Diocese.
422
  The 
decedent’s sister brought an unsuccessful undue influence challenge.423  
She alleged, among other things, that the testator was “dependent upon 
the Clergy as her means of social outlet.”424  The court saw nothing 
unusual about the elderly testator’s relationship with and reliance on the 
church as her means of social outlet.
425
 
 
VI.   Opportunity 
 
Opportunity is, perhaps, the easiest factor to establish in undue 
influence cases. Opportunity simply requires evidence that the alleged 
influencer had the opportunity to exercise undue influence.  Opportunity 
generally requires that the alleged influencer spent a meaningful amount 
of time alone with the testator.
426
  A confidential or familial relationship 
 
Boehm v. Allen, 506 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Borsch, 353 
N.W.2d 346, 349 (S.D. 1984). 
417. Borsch, 353 N.W.2d at 349. 
418. Bandurski, 281 A.2d at 624. 
419. Borsch, 353 N.W.2d at 350. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. 
422. In re Estate of Osborn, 470 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
423. Id. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 1117. 
426. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schroeder, 441 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (“Leslie Schroeder had an opportunity to exercise undue influence because he was 
the decedent’s husband, her attorney, and he drafted her will.”); In re Sechrest, 537 
S.E.2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“The evidence is further undisputed that prior to 
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tends to support a finding of opportunity.  Involvement in the preparation 
of the testament also suggests opportunity.  Yet, courts are hesitant to 
recognize the existence of opportunity in the charitable context.  For 
example, in Herman v. Kogan, the court found no opportunity to 
overreach on the part of the attorney or charity where (1) the charity’s 
attorney prepared the will; (2) the attorney was also the regional 
president of the charity; (3) all of the witnesses to the testament were 
officers of the charity; (4) the executors named in the will were officers 
of the corporation; (5) the will was deposited at the offices of the 
corporation; and (6) the attorney apparently did not charge a fee for his 
services.
427
  Despite this overwhelming evidence, the court found the 
uninformative, largely irrelevant, and obviously self-serving testimony of 
the attorney and other officers of the charity sufficiently compelling to 
dispel any presumption of overreaching or undue influence. 
 
VII.   Disposition 
 
Disposition requires a finding that the alleged influencer had “a 
disposition to influence unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper 
favor . . . .”428  “‘Disposition’ means something more than a mere desire 
to obtain a share of another’s estate.”429  Rather, disposition “implies a 
willingness to do something wrong or unfair, and grasping or 
overreaching characteristics.”430  Courts are hesitant to view the actions 
of charities and representatives as rising to this level.  In Estate of Davis 
v. Cook, the decedent left her nearly two million dolars residuary estate 
to Schreiner College, the school attended by her long deceased son.
431
  
Schreiner’s development officer began to visit Mrs. Davis in 1994.  At 
the time, she was ninety-eight-years old, “lonely, isolated, and plagued 
with physical infirmities.”432  Schreiner’s development officer offered 
estate-planning advice to Mrs. Davis.  Schreiner also “made pleas to 
[Mrs. Davis] which involved flattery, appeals to patriotism and self-
worth, glorification of the memory of her deceased son, and the allure of 
 
Harold’s death, Mowery had little contact with the testatrix and, thus, had virtually no 
opportunity to exert his will over hers.”). 
427. Herman v. Kogan, 487 So.2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
428. In re Estate of Schaefer, 241 N.W. 382, 385 (Wis. 1932); accord In re Estate 
of Stenerson, 348 N.W.2d 141, 143 (N.D. 1984). 
429. In re Estate of Brehmer, 164 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Wis. 1969). 
430. Id. 
431. In re Estate of Davis, 9 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 1999). 
432. Id. at 293. 
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membership in the Schreiner Oaks Society, an honorary society for 
Schreiner contributors.”433  The court, however, sustained summary 
judgment upholding the will finding that less than “a scintilla of 
probative evidence” gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact.434 
 
VIII.   Coveted Result 
 
The coveted result element asks “whether [the alleged influencer] 
has, for no apparent reason, been favored in the will to the exclusion of a 
natural object of the testator’s bounty.”435  Courts typically define 
‘natural objects of one’s bounty based upon the particular circumstances 
surrounding a case.
436
  “[O]rdinarily, all things being equal, the natural 
objects of a testator’s bounty are those who unless a will exists will 
inherit his property.”437  When a testator has no spouse or children, 
collateral relatives fall squarely within this description because they are 
the testator’s likely heirs in intestacy.  When collateral heirs challenge a 
bequest made to a charity, however, courts are quick to dismiss the idea 
that a collateral heir might be the natural object of the testator’s bounty.  
In Estate of Davis v. Cook, for example, the decedent left her nearly $2 
million residual estate to charity to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
438
  
In considering the naturalness of the bequest the court explained that 
“excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is not unnatural.”439  The 
opinion fails to discuss whether the testator and her collateral relatives 
had a close relationship despite the obvious relevance of such an inquiry.  
In re Campbell
440
 is similar. The testator gave the bulk of her estate to a 
college rather than her siblings, nieces and nephews.
441
  The testator had 
provided for her family under several prior wills and enjoyed a close 
relationship with her family.
442
  Despite those facts, the court concluded 
that her relatives were not the “direct sort of ‘natural objects of her 
 
433. Id. at 294. 
434. Id. 
435. In re Estate of Dejmal, 289 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Wis. 1980). 
436. See, e.g., Norris v. Bristow, 219 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Mo. 1949); L. S. Tellier, 
Instructions, in Will Contest, Defining Natural Objects of Testator's Bounty, 11 A.L.R.2d 
731, § 1 (1950). 
437. Norris, 219 S.W.2d at 370. 
438. In re Estate of Davis, 9 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App. 1999). 
439. Id. at 294. 
440. In re Will of Campbell, 573 S.E 2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
441. Id. 
442. Id. 
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bounty,’” the testator’s “interest in charity was evident . . . .”443 and the 
university demonstrated the transaction was “open, fair, and honest.”444  
Some courts go further and expressly declare charities to be the natural 
objects of a testator’s bounty.  In Estate of Overton, the court explained 
that the testator’s gratitude to the hospital for the positive outcome from 
cataract surgery “made the Minnesota Medical Foundation a natural 
object of her bounty . . . .”445 
Courts also refuse to recognize the benefits that actually inure to the 
benefit of the attorney, executor, or planned giving officer.  Burke v. 
Kehr is typical.
446
  Mr. Kehr, the decedent’s attorney, drafted and 
witnessed her will.  The will appointed Mr. Kehr as her independent 
personal representative and, in that capacity, gave him the authority to 
distribute the residue of her estate to whatever charitable organizations 
he selected.  Yet, the court held that there “was no evidence on the 
existence of a substantial benefit to Kehr . . . .”447  In the court’s view, 
the significant compensation Kehr would receive as personal 
representative was immaterial because these were “fees for services.”448  
“Such earned fees do not constitute the type of substantial economic 
benefit which gives rise to a presumption of undue influence.”449 
 
IX.   Conclusion 
 
Throughout the history of the law of wills, society struggled to 
strike the appropriate balance between freedom of testation, protection of 
families from disinheritance and charitable giving.  Intertwined in that 
balance was realization that religious organizations possessed the ability 
to frustrate both freedom of testation and family protection.  Restrains on 
charitable bequests existed in our law for many years.  However, in 
recent years virtually all restraint is gone. Charitable giving certainly 
serves a societal good.  However, courts and legislatures should 
reconsider the deference afforded charitable bequests in the law order to 
ensure the appropriate balance is maintained.  Especially in light of a 
potential “golden age of philanthropy” considered to be a product of an 
 
443. Id. at 564. 
444. Id.at 559. 
445. In re Estate of Overton, 417 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Minn. 1988). 
446. Burke v. Kehr, 876 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
447. Id. at 722. 
448. Id. 
449. Id. 
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anticipated generational transfer of wealth, it is particularly important the 
safeguards afforded to ensuring testamentary freedom and family 
security, particularly by the doctrine of undue influence and the 
interested witness rule, begin to shield testators from overreaching 
charities within the context of charitable testamentary bequests.  The 
competing public policies ensuring and providing for testamentary 
freedom, family protection and charitable giving should begin to operate 
in a way that they provide a checks and balances for one another and 
curb the imbalance toward charitable giving which may help to prevent 
the mass exploitation of this anticipated generational transfer of wealth 
by the nonprofit sector. 
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